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I. INTRODUCTION
More than a decade has elapsed since an initial attempt was
made to discern the true meaning of the term product in products
liability litigation.' At the time, a brief history of events leading up
to the adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts was outlined,2 and it was emphasized that what had at first
* Fellow, American Law Institute: Distinguished South Texas Professor of Law, St.
Mary's University School of Law; Fulbright Scholar. Universidad de Rene Gabriel Moreno,
Santa Cruz, Bolivia; LL.M., University of Michigan; M.C.LL., Southern Methodist
University; J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law; B.B.A., University of Texas. The
author would like to acknowledge the work of his student and research assistant, Geoffery
Mayfield, for writing the footnotes. His work was truly exemplary and is responsible in
large part for this Article being published.
1. See generally Charles E. Cantu, The Illusive Meaning of the Term "Product" Under
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 635, 638 (1991) (re-
flecting on the nature of the word "product" as it pertains to Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts).
2. See Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 917-18 (5th Cir. 1964) (noting the
progress and development of the application of strict liability prior to and contemporane-
ous with the revision of the original Restatement of Torts). The original Restatement of
Torts did not provide for application of strict liability based on the implied warranty of the
seller. Id. at 918. In April of 1961, Tentative Draft No. 6 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts recommended the adoption of Section 402A, recognizing the seller's strict liability,
but limiting the application to claims arising from ingestion of "food for human consump-
tion." Id. By 1962, the singular category of "food for human consumption" was clearly too
narrow, and protection under strict liability was expanded to cover "products intended for
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:341
seemed so simple subsequently proved to be somewhat complex.3
The American Law Institute in its promulgation had been ada-
mant: "One who sells any product in a defective condition '' 4 would
be held strictly liable. An examination, however, of cases involving
intimate bodily use ... whether or not [they] ha[ve] any nutritional value." Id. This cate-
gorization of strict liability application was quickly obsolete. Id. at 919. In May 1964, the
American Law Institute approved the final draft of Section 402A, which states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
3. Courts have come to various conclusions with regard to some of the language
within the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A. For example, courts have at-
tempted to distinguish between who is or is not a "seller." See, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co.,
466 P.2d 722, 726 (Cal. 1970) (finding the lessor of defective equipment strictly liable, and
thus, holding that no sale of the product is required); Stein v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 8 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 907, 910 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that a sale is not required, but merely
placing the product on the market gives rise to strict liability); see also Tabieros v. Clark
Equip. Co., 944 P.2d 1279, 1310 (Haw. 1997) (restating that a seller or lessor will be strictly
liable in tort for the injury). But see Kaplan v. C Lazy U Ranch. 615 F. Supp. 234. 237 (D.
Colo. 1985) (applying Colorado Revised Statute Section 13-21-402(1) to preclude strict tort
liability against most lessors). Courts have also struggled with the concept of what is and
what is not a "product." See, e.g.. Charles E. Cantu, The Illusive Meaning of the Term
"Product" Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 44 OKLA. L. REV. 635,
639 (1991) (observing that the threshold question of the application of products liability is
whether an injury was caused by a product). Courts have further struggled over what char-
acteristics make a product "defective," but have settled on three determinative factors.
Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: A
Mirror Crack'd, 25 GONz. L. REV. 205, 218-19 (1990). The test for determining whether a
defective product is mis-manufactured is whether the product "meets the reasonable ex-
pectations of the ordinary user-consumer." Id. at 219. A product that is defective as a
result of mis-design should be subjected to a risk-benefit analysis, where a court will weigh
the risk involved against the burden of reducing the risk. Id. at 220-21. In this scenario,
the focus is on an alternate, safer design. Id. at 221-22. A product challenged as defective
on grounds of mis-marketing is subject to the same risk-benefit analysis, but instead of
focusing on design, the focus is on the instructions and documentation that accompany the
product. Id. at 224.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added).
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the sales/service transaction,5 as well as those involving real estate,6
blood,7  electricity, 8  component parts, 9  water, 0  computer
5. See Garcia v. Edgewater Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 1243, 1249 (Il. App. Ct. 1993) (finding
that a hospital's supplying of a mitral valve constituted a sale so that a patient could bring
suit for breach of implied warranty); Riffe v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Ky. Ct. App.
1977) (holding that a contract to purchase and install an above-ground pool is a contract
for the sale of goods); see also Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737,
742 (2d Cir. 1979) (asserting that "[a] contract is for a 'service' rather than 'sale' when
'service predominates,' and the sale of items is 'incidental"'); Valley Farmers' Elevator v.
Lindsay Bros., 380 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the test is whether
a contract's predominant purpose is the rendition of a service with incidental goods or a
purchase of goods with incidental service). But see Menendez v. Paddock Pool Constr. Co.,
836 P.2d 968, 977 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that an in-ground pool is not a product for
purposes of imposing strict liability, therefore the contract was for a service); Brandt v.
Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 771 N.E.2d 470, 473-74 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (finding a
hospital not strictly liable for a faulty medical implant because the patient's primary objec-
tive is medical service); cf Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 440-41 (Md. 1983)
(stating that the "predominant factor" test is too mechanically rigid and should be modi-
fied to a "gravamen of the action" test, where the essence of the complaint is evaluated: if
the complaint involves goods. the U.C.C. will apply, but if it involves the service associated
with the goods, the U.C.C. will not apply). Typically, American courts have employed
three analytical approaches to determining whether a hybrid transaction is one of sales or
services. David W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised Definition of "Product" Under the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Product Liability, 35 TORT INS. L.J. 845. 866-67 (2000). First, courts
may apply a professional/commercial standard: if the transaction involves a recognized
professional rendering a professional skill, strict liability will not apply. Id. at 866. Second,
courts may ascertain whether the essence of the transaction is the providing of a service or
a good. Id. at 867. Lastly, at least one court has adopted a case-by-case approach based on
the underlying policy considerations. Id. at 867-68.
6. See Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ark. 1981) (finding the word
"product" as applicable to a house as to an automobile); Salka v. Dean Homes of Beverly
Hills, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902, 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (establishing that the doctrine of
strict liability applies to home builders); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 321
(N.J. 1965) (finding a builder/vendor of a home strictly liable to the lessee of the original
vendee for a manufacturing defect in the marketed product-the home). But see McClan-
ahan v. Am. Gilsonite Co.. 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1348 (D. Colo. 1980) (stressing that a refin-
ery is not a "product" within the meaning of Section 402A); Calloway v. City of Reno, 993
P.2d 1259. 1270 (Nev. 2000) (determining that townhouses are not products for purposes of
strict liability): Bd. of Educ. v. W.R. Grace Corp., 609 A.2d 92, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1992) (stating that when a general contractor performs its contract with the owner and
has no discretion, the general contractor is rendering a service); Ass'n of Unit Owners of
Bridgeview Condos v. Dunning, 69 P.3d 788, 800 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (asserting that condo-
miniums are not products within the meaning of Oregon Revised Statute Section 30.920).
7. Most states have enacted "Blood Shield Statutes" which explicitly state that blood
is not a product. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-2-314(4) (2002) (stating that the providing of
blood is a service, not a sale): ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.316(e) (Michie 2002) (providing that
in receiving blood from either a blood bank or a hospital, blood is not a product); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 36-1115 (2003) (recognizing that distributing blood for the purpose of inject-
ing it into a human body is a service): ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-316(3)(d)(i) (Michie 2001)
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(finding that supplying blood from a blood bank is a service); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-802
(Michie 2000) (limiting the liability of an individual, hospital, blood or tissue bank that
transfers or supplies blood); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (Deering 1990) (ac-
knowledging that procuring and distributing of blood is a rendition of a service by every
entity participating); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-104 (2001) (stating that legal liability with-
out fault may not be imposed on individuals dealing with blood transactions); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19a-280 (West 1997) (agreeing that selling blood from a blood bank or reser-
voir is considered a medical service); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-316(5) (2000) (expressing
that providing blood from a blood bank is a service); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(5) (West
2002) (finding that procuring, processing, or distributing blood is considered a service);
GA. CODE ANN. § 11-2-316(5) (2002) (explaining that providing blood is a service for all
participants involved in the procurement or distribution process); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 325-91 (Michie 2002) (declaring that there will be no implied warranty that blood is pure
in the absence of scientific technology to detect possible impurities); IDAHO CODE § 39-
3702 (Michie 2002) (stating that providing blood is a service unless the provider of blood
operates the blood bank for profit): 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1 (West 2003) (indicat-
ing that imposing liability without fault without regard to those engaged in transactions
with blood products is against public policy); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-12-11 (Michie 2002)
(outlining that the procurement, processing, distributing and injecting of blood is a ser-
vice); IOWA CODE ANN. § 142C.12 (West 1997) (describing that strict liability shall not
apply to the rendition of blood services); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3701 (2003) (providing
that no person rendering blood-related services shall be liable unless negligence is proved);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.125 (Michie 2002) (stating that the procurement, distribution,
or transfusion of blood is a service); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2322.1 (West 2003) (explain-
ing that strict liability is not applicable to nonprofit blood banks); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 2-108 (West 2002) (stating that providing blood is a service); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 5-630 (2002) (outlining that an obtainer, processor, or distributor of blood
products is not subject to strict liability); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316(5) (West
2003) (recognizing that providing blood and blood-related products are considered ser-
vices): MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.9121(2) (West 2003) (noting that providing blood is
a service whether remuneration is paid or not); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.9221 (West 2002)
(explaining that the provision or use of blood is a service); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-1
(2002) (establishing that the procurement, processing, distribution, or transfusion of blood
is a service); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.069 (West 2003) (describing the procurement of blood
for a transfusion as a service); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-33-102 (2001) (echoing that furnish-
ing of or injecting of blood products is a service, provided that the providing hospital or
doctor has no financial interest in the source of the blood); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4001
(2002) (advancing that procuring. processing, and the injection of blood is a service regard-
less of remuneration paid); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 460.010 (Michie 2002) (assuring that
liability for providing blood does not arise in the absence of negligence or willful miscon-
duct); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-b (2002) (stating that strict liability does not attach to
the procurement, distribution, or processing of blood); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-5 (Michie
2002) (explaining that liability for blood products only exists in the presence of negligent or
willful misconduct); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 580(4) (McKinney 2003) (describing that
the collection, processing, and distributing of blood is a public health service); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 130A-410 (2003) (stating that providing blood is a service); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-
02-33 (2001) (emphasizing that providing blood is a service, not the sale of goods); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 43-17-40 (2001) (stating that a physician, blood bank, or other entity is not
liable except for negligence or willful misconduct); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.11 (West
1992) (indicating that providing blood is a service in all aspects); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
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§ 2151 (West 2002) (distinguishing that providing blood is a transaction and not a sale);
OR. REV. STAT. § 97.968 (2000) (indicating that procuring or distributing blood is not a
sales transaction covered by implied warranty); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8333(a) (West
1998) (declaring that no person shall be liable except for negligent conduct from the trans-
fusion of blood); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-30 (2002) (stating that all aspects of providing
blood are a service); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (indicating that all
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness do not apply to a sale of blood); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-2-315.1 (Michie 2002) (providing that distributing blood is a ser-
vice); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (2002) (reiterating that procuring, processing, and
distributing blood is a service not subject to the implied warranties of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose): TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 77.003 (Vernon
2001) (declaring that any person who prepares, donates, processes, or injects blood is not
liable except for negligence, gross negligence, or an intentional tort): UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 26-31-1 (2003) (noting that providing blood is a medical service and not a sale); VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-297 (Michie 2002) (stating that "[n]o action for implied warranty shall
lie" for the procurement of blood or a transfusion of same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.54.120 (West 2003) (limiting liability for a blood supplier to negligent or willful con-
duct); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 16-23-1 (Michie 2003) (emphasizing that providing blood con-
stitutes a service by every entity in the process); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.31 (West 2002)
(recognizing that procuring blood for a medical transfusion is a service and not a sale):
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-2-316(c)(iv) (Michie 2001) (stating that implied warranties shall
not attach to the sale of blood, as the transaction is one of service). A comparable statute
could not be located for the states of New Jersey or Vermont or the District of Columbia.
However, case law in the District of Columbia and New Jersey has held that injuries result-
ing from blood transfusion are not subject to strict liability. See Fisher v. Sibley Mem'l
Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130, 1134 (D.C. App. 1979) (holding that "characterizing blood plasma as
a product governed by strict tort liability is as unnatural as forcing a blood transfusion into
the commercial sales mode"): Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 232 A.2d 879, 884-86 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967) (holding that, while "[i]t makes no difference whether the trans-
action was a sale or a service if the basic policy considerations which lead to strict liability
are applicable," blood tainted with hepatitis is not defective or unreasonably dangerous for
the purposes of 402A strict liability), rev'd on other grounds, 249 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1969).
Some states have held that the doctrine of strict liability is applicable in certain situations.
See, e.g., JKB v. Armour Pharm. Co., 660 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that a pharmaceutical company is not protected by the blood shield statute when produc-
tion is for commercial use); Rogers v. Miles Lab., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346, 1349 (Wash. 1991)
(recognizing that the statute provides that where a donor is compensated, statutory immu-
nity from liability does not apply to the transaction).
8. See Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co.. 275 N.W.2d 641, 648-49 (Wis. 1979) (pointing
to the possibility that strict liability may be imposed if the electricity was unreasonably
dangerous when it left the seller's hands). The foundation of the Ransome decision ap-
pears to be the court's perception that "[electricity] is a form of energy that can be made or
produced by men, confined, controlled, transmitted and distributed to be used as an energy
source for heat, power, and light and is distributed in the stream of commerce." Id. at 643;
see also Bryant v. Tri-County Elec. Membership Corp., 844 F. Supp. 347, 352 (W.D. Ky.
1994) (stating that electricity is a product); Stein, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910 (restating that the
selling of electricity is not required; merely placing the product on the market is sufficient);
Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051. 1057 (Colo. 1987) (defining electricity as
a product only when it reaches the point where it is made available for consumer use):
Monroe v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co.. 471 S.E.2d 854. 855 (Ga. 1996) (stating that elec-
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software," and ideas,12 sometimes held that what was involved was
tricity is a product within the meaning of the Georgia Code Section 51-1-1 1(b)(l)); Aversa
v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 451 A.2d 976, 979 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982) (noting
that where electricity has been introduced into the stream of commerce by a sale, liability
may be based on product liability unrelated to fault); Schriner v. Pa. Power & Light Co.,
501 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (stating that electricity can be a "product" within
the meaning of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A); Houston Lighting &
Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1988) (announcing that electricity is a
commodity, which, like other goods, can be manufactured, transported, and sold). But see
Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 590 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (N.Y. 1992) (writing that
electricity is not a product for purposes of strict liability); Otte v. Dayton Power & Light
Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ohio 1988) (holding that electricity falls outside the definition of
"product" because it is not made by human industry or art); Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt, 866
P.2d 756, 761 (Wyo. 1993) (decategorizing electricity as a product within the definition of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A).
9. See Loos v. Am. Energy Savers, Inc., 522 N.E.2d 841, 845 (11. App. Ct. 1988) (indi-
cating that a component part manufacturer is not strictly liable when the manufacturer has
no control over its use by an assembly purchaser): Ettinger v. Triangle-Pac. Corp., 799 A.2d
95, 104-05 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting that the manufacturer of a kit consisting of compo-
nent parts to be constructed by the purchaser may be subject to strict liability, but the
uncompleted product does not subject the maker to strict liability when it is not built by
the end purchaser). But see Carey v. Hy-Temp Mfg., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 666, 671 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (determining that a component maker can be held liable if its product is defective for
a known use): Hausmann v. Inland Truck Parts, 819 F. Supp. 802, 809 (E.D. Wis. 1993)
(proclaiming that "[w]hen a component is incorporated into a larger product, contributing
to the dangerousness of the product, the seller of the component is liable for injury caused
... unless the component was made dangerous through 'further processing or substantial
change'"); Jimenez v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 450, 481 (Cal. 2002) (noting that the manu-
facturer of windows for mass-produced houses may be held strictly liable for defects).
10. Compare Loyd v. ECO Res., Inc., 956 S.W.2d 110, 133 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (stating that water is not a product subject to strict liability when it
contains injurious contaminants in its natural state). with Moody v. City of Galveston, 524
S.W.2d 583. 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (emphasizing
that water contaminated with flammable gas is a defective product).
11. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 19 reporter's note. cmt. d (1998)
(stating that "[w]hen a court will have to decide whether to extend strict liability to com-
puter software, it may draw an analogy between the treatment of software under the Uni-
form Commercial Code and under products liability law"). Compare Advent Sys. Ltd. v.
Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that "once in the form of a floppy
disc the program is tangible. moveable and available in the marketplace"). with RRX In-
dus. v. Lab-Con, Inc.. 772 F.2d 543. 546 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the purchase of a
software system is a purchase of goods, in spite of incidental training which accompanied
the purchase), and System Design & Mgmt. Info.. Inc. v. Kansas City Post Office Employ-
ees Credit Union, 788 P.2d 878, 881-82 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that computer
software constitutes a good under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-105(1), and not a
service), with Data Processing Serv. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314. 318 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986) (finding that the design, development and implementation of "an electronic
data processing system" is a service, not a sale of goods), overruled on other grounds by
Insul-Mark Midwest. Inc. v. Modern Materials, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 550. 554 (Ind. 1993), and
Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97, 98, 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding
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a product.13 This would at first glance appear to be contrary to the
ordinary meaning of the term.14 But what became clear was that
that a contract for the development of a new programmable controller was a service con-
tract and not a contract for the purchase of goods).
12. See Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(stating that aeronautical charts qualify as products under strict products liability). But see
Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991) (declining to extend
products liability "to embrace the ideas and expressions in a book"); Jones v. J.B. Lippin-
cott Co.. 694 F. Supp. 1216. 1218 (D. Md. 1988) (mem.) (choosing not to "hold [defendant]
strictly liable as publisher for the content of books that it publishes"): Way v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 856 S.W.2d 230, 239 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied) (determining that "ideas,
thoughts, words, and information conveyed ... are not products within the meaning of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts"). Imposition of strict liability toward "ideas" or written
expression appears to be limited to items in which the purchaser of the item must, at the
time of the use of the item, rely on the item absolutely. See Fluor Corp., 216 Cal. Rptr. at
70 (applying strict liability to respondent, the maker of an instrument approach chart, after
the pilot relied on an inaccurate chart and crashed into a hill). The cases that have im-
posed strict liability against the manufacturers of aeronautical charts seem to exemplify
this. Id. at 71 (holding that a navigational chart was a product). A pilot using an aeronau-
tical chart has no option but to use the chart: his reliance is virtually absolute. Id. at 70.
However, a person experimenting with presumably edible mushrooms is not placed in the
same necessity of reliance on the content of the book. See Winter, 938 F.2d at 1033 (con-
sidering injury to mushroom enthusiasts resulting from reliance on information in a mush-
room book).
13. Many state statutes define what a "product" is. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 6-1302(3)
(Michie 1998) (stating that a product "means any object possessing intrinsic value ...
produced for introduction into trade or commerce"): Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
§ 5-115(a)(4) (2002) (classifying a product as "a tangible article, including attachments,
accessories, and component parts. and accompanying labels, warnings, instructions, and
packaging"): OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(L)(1) (West 1992) (noting that a product is
'any object, substance, mixture, or raw material that constitutes tangible personal property
... [that] is capable of delivery .... produced, manufactured, or supplied for introduction
into trade or commerce, [and] intended for sale or lease to persons for commercial or
personal use"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(5) (2000) (stating that "any tangible object
or goods produced" is a product); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010(3) (West 1992) (stat-
ing that a product includes "any object possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery either
as an assembled whole or as a component part or parts"). Some courts have also defined
the term "product." See, e.g., Pierson v. Sharp Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "[a] product is a physical article which results from a
manufacturing process and is ultimately delivered to a consumer"); Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt,
866 P.2d 756, 770 (Wyo. 1993) (holding that "[a] 'product' is anything made by human
industry or art" (quoting Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ohio
1998))).
14. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (7th ed. 1999) (defining product as
"[s]omething that is distributed commercially for use or consumption and that is usu[ally]
(1) tangible personal property, (2) the result of fabrication or processing, and (3) an item
that has passed through a chain of commercial distribution before ultimate use or con-
sumption"), WEBSTER'S DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICrIONARY 1436 (2d ed. 1983) (defining
a product as "1. that which is produced by nature or made by industry or art ... 2. result:
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courts had generally rejected a primary dictionary definition, and
instead adopted a policy-based technique to determine whether the
transaction before them deserved Section 402A protection.' 5 In
short, the courts had employed a backdoor approach. They did not
start with the issue of whether a product was involved. Instead,
they determined whether the transaction was one which should
come under the umbrella of strict products liability, and then con-
cluded if necessary that they were dealing with goods.16 As was
[or] outgrowth"). As provided in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
§ 19 (1998):
(a) A product is tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or con-
sumption. Other items, such as real property and electricity, are products when the
context of their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the distribution and
use of tangible personal property that it is appropriate to apply the rules stated in this
Restatement.
(b) Services, even when provided commercially, are not products.
(c) Human blood and human tissue, even when provided commercially, are not sub-
ject to the rules of this Restatement.
15. See Rossetti v. Busch Entm't Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(mem.) (recognizing that when the policy is not served, strict liability does not apply);
Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343, 347 (Haw. 1982) (stating that safety re-
quires the greatest amount of protection available by law, and by placing goods on the
market, a maker represents that the product is suitable for use, and that the burden of
accidental injuries should be borne by those in the distribution chain as a consequential
cost of doing business): Trent v. Brasch Mfg. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (11. App. Ct. 1985)
(explaining that "'the social policy justifications' underlying the adoption of strict liability,
rather than a dictionary definition of the term 'product,' should be determinative"); Heller
v. Cadral Corp., 406 N.E.2d 88, 89 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980) (stating that the determination of
what is a product should be based on the policy reasons underlying strict products liability
instead of dictionary definitions); Jackson v. City of Franklin, 554 N.E.2d 932, 938 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that policy reasons underlying strict products liability should be
considered to determine whether a thing is a product).
16. See, e.g., King v. Damiron Corp., 113 F.3d 93. 95 (7th Cir. 1997) (declining to hold
a dealer of used goods strictly liable): Condos v. Musculoskeletal Transplant Found.. 208 F.
Supp. 2d 1226. 1230 (D. Utah 2002) (determining that whether strict products liability
should be extended to the distribution of human tissue for medical procedures is a policy-
driven inquiry): Pippin v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.. 78 F. Supp. 2d 487. 491 (D. Md. 1999)
(indicating that before strict liability may attach, the transaction must include either a man-
ufacturer or seller); Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789,
798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that the imposition of strict liability on an auctioneer will
not further the policy consideration of risk reduction or encourage the safer manufacture
of products); Perez v. Fid. Container Corp., 682 N.E.2d 1150, 1154 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)
(recognizing that raw material packaged in an intermediate state is not a "product," and
therefore strict liability does not apply); Sprung v. MTR Ravensburg Inc., 788 N.E.2d 620.
622-23 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that generally, where the sale of a product is casual or occa-
sional, there is no strict liability; however, when bargaining disparity between two parties is
equal, strict liability may lie); Beyer v. Aquarium Supply Co., 404 N.Y.S.2d 778. 779 (N.Y.
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shown, this led to some unusual results. Subject matter that no one
would have ever considered as such was deemed to be a product.17
In this Article, we will continue our search. 8 At times whimsi-
cal,19 and at others sublime, 20 the cases continue their path of ex-
App. Div. 1977) (stating that the application of strict liability is not limited to complex
manufactured parts, but the purpose of the doctrine is to distribute fairly "the inevitable
consequences of commercial enterprise and to promote the marketing of safe products");
Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1304 (Or. 1979) (concluding that policy consid-
erations preclude applying strict liability to dealers selling used goods): Spellmeyer v. Wey-
erhaeuser Corp., 544 P.2d 107, 109-10 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that "policy
considerations which support imposition of strict liability in other contexts are too severely
diluted"); see also David W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised Definition of "Product" Under the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 845, 873 (2000) (stat-
ing that the extensions of the definition of a product can be supported by the underlying
strict liability policy reasoning).
17. See Bryant v. Tri-County Elec. Membership Corp., 844 F. Supp. 347, 352 (W.D.
Ky. 1994) (recognizing that electricity is a product, but stray voltage is not); Blagg v. Fred
Hunt Co.. 612 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Ark. 1981) (indicating that a house is a product); Gem
Developers v. Hallcraft Homes of San Diego, 261 Cal. Rptr. 626, 634 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(indicating that graded lots which had subsided are "products"): Stanton v. Carlson Sales.
Inc., 728 A.2d 534, 538 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) (extending strict products liability to used
products): Worrell v. Sachs, 563 A.2d 1387, 1388 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) (defining a dis-
eased, parasite-carrying puppy as a product); Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 588 P.2d 233,
236 (Wash. 1978) (holding a restaurant strictly liable for injuries incurred by breaking a
wine glass, notwithstanding the consumable wine in the glass); see also David W. Lannetti,
Toward a Revised Definition of "Product" Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product
Liability, 35 TORT & INS. L. J. 845, 873 (2000) (asserting that the broadening of the inter-
pretation of what constitutes a product was supported by the underlying strict liability pol-
icy reasoning).
18. See generally Charles E. Cantu, The Illusive Meaning of the Term "Product" Under
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 44 OKLA. L. REv. 635, 638 (1991) (stat-
ing that ingenious plaintiff's attorneys and the willingness of courts to protect plaintiffs will
expand the search for the definition of "product"). Furthermore, the trend has already
greatly been extended beyond what was originally intended by the American Law Institute
at the promulgation of Section 402A. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PROD.
LIAB. § 19 cmt. A (1997) (explaining that the American Law Institute has provided a defi-
nition for the term product because of its importance in the application of strict liability).
19. See, e.g., Brumley v. Pfizer, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 305. 313 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (stating
that liability did not arise from the failure to warn the patient of increased libido, which
resulted in a heart attack during intercourse): CEF Enters.. Inc. v. Betts. 838 So. 2d 999.
1007 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (deciding that a negligence and breach of warranty standard is
appropriate in a case where a complaining customer consumed a bug hidden in a restau-
rant biscuit).
20. See Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641, 648-49 (Wis. 1979) (pro-
posing that an electric company could be strictly liable if the electricity "was in a condition
not contemplated by the ultimate consumer and unreasonably dangerous to him" when it
left the seller's hands); O'Malley v. Am. LaFrance, Inc., No. 00-CV-1421, 2002 WL
32068354, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2002) (determining that an unfinished fire truck can be
a product): see also Allen Michel et al., Protecting Future Product Liability Claimants, 18
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ploration. The results, however, appear to be the same. Courts
continue to employ a line of reasoning that disregards any initial
attempt at defining the item in controversy. 21 Instead, they con-
tinue to determine at the outset whether the dispute is one that
should receive the advantages of Section 402A of the Restate-
ment,22 and then conclude by necessity that the controversy does in
fact involve a product.23  The following discussion will make this
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 1999 ABI JNL LEXIS 205, at *8-9 (1999) (examining how a court
allocated resources of an insolvent aircraft manufacturer to defend and compensate victims
of future accidents that result from the product defect).
21. See Rossetti v. Busch Entm't Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (sug-
gesting that the basis for imposing strict liability is speculative); Trent v. Brasch Mfg. Co.,
477 N.E.2d 1312, 1317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (declining to decide whether a ventilation system
is a product): Heller v. Cadral Corp., 406 N.E.2d 88, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (refusing to
hold that a condominium is a product); Jackson v. City of Franklin, 554 N.E.2d 932, 938
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (examining the policy justifications for strict liability to determine
whether a product is involved, and ultimately holding that the contractor who built the
pool provided a service rather than a product); see also Leong v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 970
P.2d 972, 975 (Haw. 1998) (declining to establish a firm definition of a product, but evalu-
ating public policy considerations to determine if strict liability should apply).
22. See Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 395 (Ill. 1987)
(holding that strict liability does not apply to X-radiation). The Kirk court exemplifies this
approach by stating:
In cases involving goods and other tangible physical materials, which are in some way
bad, imposition of liability unquestionably enhances the public interest in human life
and health. However, in cases which deal with the conduct of individuals or institu-
tions which themselves are pledged to protect human life and health, precautions must
be taken to avoid an ultimate diminution of protection. For the reasons stated we
conclude that public policy dictates against the imposition of strict liability in tort for
injuries resulting from the administration of X-radiation treatments by a hospital.
Id. (quoting Greenberg v. Michael Reese Hosp., 415 N.E.2d 390. 390 (Ill. 1980)) see also
Trent v. Brasch Mfg. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (111. Ct. App. 1985) (evaluating policy
considerations that support the imposition of strict liability, prior to determining if a com-
ponent part of a building is a product subject to strict liability).
23. See Papp v. Rocky Mountain Oil & Mineral Inc.. 769 P.2d 1249. 1256 (Mont. 1989)
(stating that buildings are not typically products, but mass production of a item for sale
renders the item for sale subject to Section 402A); see also William C. Powers Jr., Distin-
guishing Between Products and Services in Strict Liability. 62 N.C. L. REV. 415. 430 (1984)
(suggesting that courts could use the ability to prove negligence as the test of whether strict
liability could apply); Dana Shelhimer, Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions and
the Strict Liability Dilemma, 43 Sw. L.J. 785, 813 (1989) (suggesting a policy-based ap-
proach to decide the sales-service hybrid transaction and balancing the justifications for
strict liability against the need of the public to have access to the product or service).
Professor Powers argues that whether in a service or hybrid transaction, where proving a
case under a negligence theory would be difficult, strict liability could be applied. William
C. Powers Jr., Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict Liability. 62 N.C. L.
REV. 415.430 (1984). However, in a case where proving negligence is possible, the plaintiff
would not be able to proceed under a strict liability theory. Id. Perhaps the best example
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clear, but nowhere is it better exemplified than with the cases in-
volving food.
II. CASES INVOLVING FOOD
Anglo-American jurisprudence has always held the purveyor of
foodstuff responsible for any injuries resulting from a defective
condition.24 Prior to the rise of strict products liability, food sellers
involves transactions in which blood is sold or exchanged. Id. at 426. Blood could clearly
be categorized as a product, however, the policy justifications for considering blood a prod-
uct under Section 402A do not comport with public needs, and therefore blood, even prior
to the legislative enactments of the "blood shield" statutes discussed previously, was not
considered a "product" to which strict products liability would apply. Id. Conversely, real
property arguably is not a "product." Real property lacks most, if not all of the attributes
that courts and legislatures require a "product" to possess. See supra note 13 (discussing
state statutes which define "product"). However, applying strict liability to homebuilders
furthers the policy justifications supporting strict liability. See supra note 6 and infra notes
63-64 (citing cases that determine whether or not the term "product" applies to homes).
Thus, courts have held that in certain situations, real property may be a product under
Section 402A.
24. See Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 735 (1970) (stating that at early English common
law, rules against the selling of unwholesome food were confined to sales of food for imme-
diate consumption). The source of liability was criminal in nature as stated by the court.
[d. "If a man sells victuals which is [sic] corrupt, without warranty, an action lies, because
it is against the commonwealth." Id. (quoting Roswell v. Vaughn, 79 Eng. Rep. 171 (K.B
1606)). Professor Titus continues by citing an unnamed early English case, Y.B. 9 Hen. VI,
f.53b, which addresses the existence of a warranty for food meant for consumption by
quoting the judge in the case.
The warranty ... is not material: For if I came into a tavern to eat and the taverner
gives and sells me beer or food which is corrupt, by which I am put to great suffering, I
shall clearly have an action against the taverner on the case even though he makes no
warranty to me.
Id. American cases, as early as 1815, suggested that special warranties were implied in the
sales of food for immediate consumption. Id. at 736. The courts further came to the early
conclusion that the justification for the food warranties was not based in contract, but
rather on policy. Id.
The law in relation to the sale of provisions stands upon an entirely different footing:
there, out of regard to the health and lives of men, the law always implies the article
sold to be sound and whole some, and fit for food .... This implied warranty must
prevail in all cases in the sale of provisions: the party having an opportunity to ex-
amine the article, does not exempt the vendor from liability, unless the defect in the
article be so palpable that the most unskillful and inexperienced, can from examina-
tion or from inspection, easily detect it, or the purchaser at the time be informed of
the defect, or the vendor informed that the article is wanted for other purposes than
for food for man.
Id. at 736-37 (quoting Wright v. Hart, 18 Wend. 449, 456 (N.Y. 1837)): see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A cmt. b (1965) ("stating that [a]s long ago as 1266 there
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had been liable under the theory of actionable negligence,25 and
then under the concept of an implied warranty of fitness.26 After
the introduction of strict products liability in the 1960s, the trend
continued.2 7 Theoretically, the initial question in this type of scena-
rio should be whether the transaction involves the rendering of a
service, or the selling of a product. For example, a bowl of spinach
were enacted special criminal statutes imposing penalties upon . ..brewers, butchers,
cooks, and other persons who supplied 'corrupt' food and drink").
25. See Kyle v. Swift & Co.. 229 F.2d 887. 889 (4th Cir. 1956) (stating that a manufac-
turer of hot dog wieners may be held liable for harm under the theory of actionable negli-
gence); Gramex Corp. v. Green Supply, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Mo. 2002) (discussing
that Missouri tort law originally hinged on whether the defendant exercised reasonable
care); Rosenbusch v. Ambrosia Milk Corp., 168 N.Y.S. 505, 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917)
(holding that it was reasonable to charge the manufacturer of a powdered milk product
with negligence when it knew that the product was liable to deteriorate by time, tempera-
ture, or climate); Turner v. Wilson, 86 S.E.2d 867, 870 (S.C. 1955) (showing that a retailer
of deviled egg sandwiches may be held liable under a negligence theory if the customer
becomes ill).
26. See, e.g., Martel v. Duffy-Mott Corp., 166 N.W.2d 541, 548 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968)
(holding that recovery for unwholesome applesauce may be allowed on the basis of breach
of implied warranty of merchantability); Metty v. Shurfine Cent. Corp., 736 S.W.2d 527,
530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (per curiam) (adhering to the rule that food for immediate con-
sumption is impliedly warranted to be wholesome and fit for consumption); Welch v.
Schielbelhuth, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957) (stating that an implied warranty
of quality and wholesomeness of food offered for sale imposes an obligation by law upon
one who causes the wrong); Ayala v. Bartolome, 940 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex. App.-East-
land 1997, no pet.) (showing that a retailer who sells unwholesome food is liable under an
implied warranty as a matter of public policy (citing Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 164
S.W.2d 835, 840 (1942))): Walters v. United Grocery Co.. 172 P. 473, 474 (Utah 1918)
(holding a retailer of potato salad liable under breach of implied warranty of
merchantability).
27. See Scheller v. Wilson Certified Foods. Inc.. 559 P.2d 1074. 1076 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1976) (discussing how the theory of liability under breach of implied warranty has merged
into strict liability); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 212 A.2d 69. 72 (Vt. 1965) (abolish-
ing the requirement of privity for recovery on the theory of breach of implied warranty
with regard to food products): Gates v. Standard Brands Inc.. 719 P.2d 130. 134 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that a cause of action for breach of implied warranty has been suc-
ceeded by the consumer expectation test): see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (Prelim. Draft No. 6. 1958) (showing that as initially prepared. and unanimously
approved, the section applied only to foodstuffs); William L. Prosser, Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 801 (1966) (discussing the pre-
dominant use of breach of implied warranty).
Until 1962 [breach of implied] warranty had held the field, and no court proceeded on
any other basis, although a good many of them had realized that this was a new and
different kind of 'warranty,' not arising out of or dependent upon any contract, but
imposed by law, in tort, as a matter of policy.
William L. Prosser, Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV.
791, 801 (1966).
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purchased in a cafeteria would be considered a service when con-
trasted to a can of spinach, which, if obtained in a grocery store,
would be considered a product.28 The sales/service transaction dis-
cussed earlier, 29 which delved into the so-called predominant factor
of the sale, 30 made this clear. In other words, if the reason for en-
tering into the agreement is the knowledge, skill, or expertise of
the provider, then we are confronted with a service.31 If, however,
the subject matter is what induced the purchase, we have a prod-
28. The author would like to reflect that the bowl of spinach/cafeteria portion analogy
is a pedagogical example used by Dean Keeton to provide an example of the difference
between food products which may be a service (cafeteria spinach) and those which are a
product (can of spinach). This differential view was traditionally a minority view prevalent
in only a few jurisdictions. See, for example Nisky v. Childs Co., 135 A. 805, 806 (N.J.
1927), which stated that "[t]he service of food at eating houses has never been and cannot
be regarded as a sale at common law." Although presently this view is virtually non-exis-
tent, the demise of this view highlights this Article's function: analyzing what is and what is
not a product under Section 402A and the ability of courts to modify the scope of what is a
product or may become a product.
29. See Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 437 (Md. Ct. App. 1983) (deciding
whether a diving board, when installed with a pool, was a sale of goods or a service): see
also supra note 6 (citing cases that discuss whether certain home-building activities are
products or services).
30. See Bonebrake v. Cox. 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that the test to
determine whether a contract was for a sale or service is "whether their predominant fac-
tor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of a service, with goods
incidentally involved . . . or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved").
Bonebrake appears to be the first court to consolidate the previously used professional/
commercial and essence tests into a newly labeled test, which assimilated portions of both
previously used tests. Accord Rassa v. Rollins Protective Serv. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 538, 542
(D. Md. 1998) (stating that in a hybrid contract, U.C.C. protections still apply to the
"goods" component of a contract). There further appears to be a split of authority over
whether the application of the "predominant factor" test in the classification of a hybrid
contract as one for goods or services is a matter of law or fact. Compare Keitzer v. Land
O'Lakes, No. C800488. 2002 WL 233746. at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002) (discussing
that whether a contract is for goods or services is a matter of law), with Home Ins. Co v.
Detroit Fire Extinguisher Co.. 538 N.W.2d 424. 427 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (asserting that
there exists a material issue of fact regarding whether the contract was for sale of goods or
rendition of a service).
31. See AKA Distrib. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 137 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a contract for vacuum cleaner sales in conjunction with design input by the
vendee is a contract for the sale of goods): Condos v. Musculoskeletal Transplant Found.,
208 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Utah 2002) (finding that supplying a patient with bone
tissue is not the sale of a product because the patient's intention is seeking medical ser-
vices); Lake & Piepkow Farms v. Purina Mills, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 791, 794 (W.D. Mich.
1997) (determining that custom blended cattle feed is a sale of goods with incidental
services).
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uct.32 The distinction is an important one because if confronted
with a service, the only available remedy for an injured plaintiff is
actionable negligence.33 It is only when a product is at issue that
the aggrieved party may select from actionable negligence,34 war-
ranty,35 and strict products liability.36
32. See Almquist v. Finley Sch. Dist. No. 53, 57 P.3d 1191, 1196 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(finding that school cafeteria lunches are products). The Almquist court further held that
when an educational, medical, or research organization provides lunch for a fee, the sale of
the lunch is not so intricately tied to the service to render the providing of the lunch ex-
empt from the Washington Product Liability Act. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2002)
(stating that "serving for value of food or drink to be consumed" is considered a sale under
the U.C.C.).
33. See Charles E. Cantu, The Illusive Meaning of the Term "Product" Under Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 44 OKLA. L. REv. 635, 639-40 (1991) (discussing
the application of strict liability in service and product cases). Negligence should be used
instead of strict liability as a recovery vehicle in service transactions because: (1) individu-
als practice inexact sciences and should only be held to a reasonable person standard; (2)
plaintiffs interact and do business "directly with the person responsible"; and (3) "services
are not mass-produced," thus, the policy reasons supporting strict liability are inapplicable,
Id. at 639-40; see also Altieri v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 2002 WL 31898323, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2002) (finding that a pharmacist provides a service and cannot be held
to the products liability act); Bruzga v. PMR Architects, P.C., 693 A.2d 401, 405-06 (N.H.
1997) (declining to extend strict liability to architects or builders because the transaction
involves a service).
34. See Kyle v. Swift & Co., 229 F.2d 887, 889 (4th Cir. 1956) (finding sufficient evi-
dence to try both the manufacturer and retailer for negligence), Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co., 150 P.2d 436. 439 (Cal. 1944) (discussing possible situations in which the
defendant manufacturer may be found negligent); Mushatt v. Page Milk Co., 262 So. 2d
520, 523 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (shifting the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defen-
dant to prove non-negligence once a prima facie case was made); Gramex Corp. v. Green
Supply. Inc., 89 S.W.3d 432. 438-39 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (tracing the history of the deter-
mination of liability back to negligence).
35. See Martel v. Duffy-Mott Corp., 166 N.W.2d 541, 545 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (al-
lowing recovery for unwholesome applesauce on the basis of breach of implied warranty of
merchantability): Metty v. Shurfine Cent. Corp., 736 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(per curiam) (reiterating the court's policy that food for immediate consumption is im-
pliedly warranted to be wholesome and fit for consumption): Welch v. Schiebelhuth, 169
N.Y.S.2d 309. 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957) (interpreting the implied warranty of quality and
wholesomeness of food offered for sale as imposing a legal obligation upon the wrong-
doer): Ayala v. Bartolome. 940 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex. App.-Eastland t997, no pet.) (find-
ing that a retailer who sells unwholesome food is liable under an implied warranty imposed
by law as a matter of public policy); Walters v. United Grocery Co., 172 P. 473, 474 (Utah
1918) (holding the retailer of potato salad liable under breach of implied warranty of
merchantability).
36. See McCroy ex rel. McCroy v. Coastal Mart, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270 (D.
Kan. 2002) (noting that Kansas products liability law merges legal theories of negligence,
breach of implied warranty, and strict liability into a "products liability" claim): Jackson v.
Thomas, 21 P.3d 1007, 1009 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing that the Kansas Products
Liability Act includes action based on negligence, breach of warranty, or strict liability);
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While the sales/service hybrid transaction analysis should, in the-
ory, be the initial line of reasoning in determining whether food-
stuff falls under the protection of Section 402A, courts appear to
implicitly recognize food as a product.3" Whether Section 402A
provides relief for an injured plaintiff turns on whether the food
product is defective,38 or is so contaminated that it is in a corrup-
tive state, or if there is merely an impurity which, while repugnant
to some, prevents a finding of liability.39 Originally, this was deter-
Creach v. Sara Lee Corp., 502 S.E.2d 923, 923-24 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing an injured
plaintiff to recover under negligence, breach of warranty, or strict liability theories); Cobb
v. Dallas Fort Worth Med. Ctr.-Grand Prairie, 48 S.W.3d 820 826 (Tex. App.-Waco
2001, no pet.) (claiming a plaintiff may bring causes of action involving a product in negli-
gence, strict liability, or breach of warranty); see also Conn. Gen. Stat ANN. § 52-572n
(West 2003) (stating that a products liability claim against a product seller may be asserted
either in negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty); cf. Hitachi Const. Mach. Co. v.
Amax Coal Co., 737 N.E.2d 460, 465 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing that an action based
on the Indiana Products Liability Act may sound in negligence or strict liability, while the
Uniform Commercial Code governs actions based on a breach of warranty).
37. See Wachtel v. Rosol, 271 A.2d 84, 86 (Conn. 1970) (extending Section 402A to
food provided by a restaurant); Koster v. Scotch Assoc., 640 A.2d 1225, 1228 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1993) (holding that by adopting the U.C.C., New Jersey had discarded the
minority view that food served in a restaurant or cafeteria was the rendition of a service):
England v. Sanford 561 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (mem.) (stating that a
caterer's relationship to guests is identical to a restaurant's relationship to guests such that
both are subject to strict liability). The Koster court further states that it is an anachronism
that food sold in a store is warranted, but food sold in a restaurant is not. Koster, 640 A.2d
at 1128.
38. See Holowaty v. McDonald's Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1084 (D. Minn. 1998)
(mem.) (considering a food product defective "if the harm causing characteristics of the
product would not have been expected by a reasonable consumer"); Campbell Soup Co. v.
Gates, 889 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Ark. 1994) (requiring the plaintiff to prove that the injury-
causing product in question was defective when it left the particular seller's possession): see
also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co., 326 F. Supp. 504, 508 (W.D. Mo.
1971) (referring to the trial court's decision that the bacteria-infested cheese was defec-
tive), rev'd on other grounds. 457 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1972): Chambley v. Apple Rests.. Inc..
504 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that it is a question of fact whether a
condom found in a salad makes it defective); Bullara v. Checker's Drive-In Rest., 736 So.
2d 936, 938 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (permitting plaintiff's recovery after she ate part of a
cockroach in her chilidog).
39. See, e.g., Greif v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 114 F. Supp. 2d 100, 103 (D. Conn. 2000)
(stating that beer is not defective although it contains alcohol); Vuletich v. Alivotvodic, 392
N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (noting that a consumer's consumption of beer and
subsequent injury to the plaintiff were not sufficient to give rise to an inference of a defect
in the beer): Phillips v. Rest. Mgmt. of Caroline, L.P., 552 S.E.2d 686, 696 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001) (stating that the restaurant corporation was not liable for breach of warranty where a
restaurant employee spat in the food); Thompson v. East Pac. Enters., 115 Wash. App.
1042, 1054 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that food containing a peanut product which
causes a severe allergic reaction is not defective), see also Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp.. 911
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mined under the so-called "foreign-natural test, ' 4° which inquires
into the nature of the substance. If the object in controversy is
natural to the foodstuff, such as a fragment of shell in pecan pie,4'
there is no one to hold strictly liable. If, on the other hand, the
substance is foreign, such as a piece of glass in a candy bar,42 liabil-
P.2d 1243, 1254 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining the idiosyncratic response defense as an
eliminating factor of food's defectiveness). The Jones court expounded upon the elements
of an "idiosyncratic allergic response" defense, which may remove liability from a manu-
facturer when the injury occurring to the plaintiff is unique and not experienced by a large
population percentage. Id. To assert a defense, the defendant must first produce evidence
that the plaintiff's injury results from an allergic reaction. Id. If this requirement is met,
the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the reaction "could be exper-
ienced by an identifiable class of consumers." Id.
40. See generally Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 59 P.2d 144 (Cal. 1936) (promulgating
the foreign natural test), overruled by Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145,
155 (Cal. 1992). The "foreign-natural test" was first announced by the California Supreme
Court, which stated:
[Clertain cases present facts from which the court itself may say as a matter of law that
the alleged defect does not fall within the terms of the statute [California Uniform
Sales Act]. . . . [B]ones which are natural to the type of meat served cannot legiti-
mately be called a foreign substance, and a consumer who eats meat dishes ought to
anticipate and be on his guard against the presence of such bones.
Id. at 148; see also Jane Massey Draper, Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death Allegedly
Caused by Food Product Containing Object Related to, but Not Intended to Be, Present in
Product. 2 A.L.R. 5th 189 (1992) (highlighting the nature of the foreign-natural test).
[T]he court promulgated ... the ... test for determining liability for injuries caused by
objects in food which are natural and related to the food but not intended to be in the
food. [The] test creates liability, on the basis of breach of an implied warranty of
wholesomeness and reasonable fitness for human consumption, for the vendor of food
containing a foreign object which injures a consumer, but absolves the vendor where
the object is natural to the food, since the presence of the natural object does not
render the food unwholesome, nor, on the premise that a consumer is not entitled to
expect perfect food. does it render the food not reasonably fit for human consump-
tion. With regard to negligence, this test requires a consumer to act upon common
knowledge that certain food products may contain natural parts of the ingredients.
albeit not intended to be in the final product....
Id. at 201.
41. Jackson v. Nestle-Beich. Inc., 589 N.E.2d 547. 548-49 (Ill. 1992). See generally
Ford v. Miller Meat Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (concerning a bone
fragment in ground beef); Porteous v. St. Ann's Cafe & Deli, 713 So. 2d 454 (La. 1998)
(involving a pearl found in a raw oyster): Mitchell v. T.G.I. Friday's, 748 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2000) (involving a clam shell found in fried clam strip); Williams v. Braum Ice
Cream Stores, Inc.. 534 P.2d 700 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (involving a cherry pit contained in
cherry ice cream).
42. Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 141 So. 762, 763 (Miss. 1932). See generally Hick-
man v. Wm. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 768 So. 2d 812 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (dealing with finding a
metal screw in chewing gum); CEF Enters. v. Betts, 838 So. 2d 999 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003)
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ity is sure to follow. While employed for many years, this test has
been replaced by the more modern approach, which inquires into
the reasonable expectations of a consumer. 43 The test has been ap-
plied in other areas of product litigation such as mis-manufactur-
ing,4 4 and is a test that asks: does the substance meet the
(concerning insect-contaminated food); Cohen v. Allendale Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 351
S.E.2d 897 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (involving a dead insect in a bottle of cola).
43. See generally Jane Massey Draper, Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death Alleg-
edly Caused by Food Product Containing Object Related to, but Not Intended to Be, Present
in Product, 2 A.L.R. 5th 189 (1992) (distinguishing between the foreign/natural test and the
reasonable expectation test, and stating that the foreign-natural test focuses on the rela-
tionship between the foreign object and the location of its discovery, while the reasonable
expectation test focuses on whether the consumer might reasonably expect to find such
object in the particular type of dish or style of food served). In an action for breach of
implied warranty, liability rests on whether the food is "reasonably fit," and whether the
consumer should have anticipated the object. If so, the food was reasonably fit under the
warranty. Id. at 202. If the customer ought to have reasonably anticipated such an object,
then the vendor has breached no duty. Id. In an action based on recovery theories of
negligence. "the query becomes the foreseeability of harm on the part of the vendor, and
the duty imposed is one of ordinary care to remove from a food product such harmful
objects as a consumer would not ordinarily anticipate and guard against." Id. See gener-
ally Ex parte Morrison's Cafeteria of Montgomery, Inc.. 431 So. 2d 975 (Ala. 1983) (pro-
viding that a consumer may reasonably expect fish bones in a fish fillet): Johnson v. S. Pac.
Canning Co., 580 So. 2d 556 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that a fish eye lens in a can of tuna
was not natural, and could not be reasonably expected by a consumer), abrogated by
Porteous v. St. Ann's Caf6 &Deli, 713 So. 2d 454, 456 n.3 (La. 1998); Phillips v. Town of
West Springfield, 540 N.E.2d 1331 (Mass. 1989) (noting that a high school student may
reasonably expect to find a turkey bone in a school-provided lunch). The Phillips court
further stated that the reasonable expectation test is preferable to the foreign-natural test
because the foreign-natural test "fails to focus the seller's attention on the consumer's rea-
sonable beliefs and to recognize that sellers may fairly be held responsible in some in-
stances for natural substances in food that cause injury." Phillips, 540 N.E.2d at 1333; see
also Langiulli v. Bumble Bee Seafood, Inc., 604 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993)
(holding that the reasonable expectation test should be applied to determine whether the
customer should reasonably expect to find a bone fragment in canned tuna); Ruvolo v.
Homovich, 778 N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (stating that a restaurant customer
should reasonably expect to find a chicken bone in a chicken sandwich): Jefferies v. Clark's
Rest. Enters., 580 P.2d 1103. 1105 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that whether a patron
could reasonably expect to find crab shell in a crab sandwich is a question for the jury).
44. See Gibson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447 (W.D. Va. 2002)
(stating that a court may use consumers' reasonable expectation of marketing and packag-
ing in determining what constitutes an unreasonably dangerous defect); Pierce v. Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283. 287 n.] (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (declaring that determining
whether electricity is defective depends on the reasonable expectation of the homeowner);
Van Wyk v. Norden Labs., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 81, 84 (Iowa 1984) (finding that the warranty
of merchantability is based on the purchaser's reasonable expectation that goods pur-
chased will be free from significant defects): Gable v. Gates Mills, 784 N.E.2d 739, 748
(Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (finding that complying with statutory regulation does not immunize
a manufacturer from liability; such evidence should be considered by a jury when deter-
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reasonable expectations of our user/consumer? This, by necessity,
will almost always be a question of fact for the jury;45 however, it
does offer a reliable and easily applied benchmark for defective
foodstuff. Whatever is found in the food will undergo the scrutiny
of the jury, which determines whether consumers would reasonably
expect to find the suspect substance in whatever they are eating. A
hypodermic needle in a breakfast sandwich,46 monosodium gluta-
mate (MSG) in vegetable soup,4 7 vibrio vulnificus bacteria in raw
oysters,48 a metal screw in a stick of chewing gum, 49 cinnamic alde-
hyde chemical in candy,50 escherichia (E.) coli in a school lunch,5'
the addictive nature of a Big Mac, 52 or a defective wine glass;
53
these have all undergone the test. What is so noteworthy about
these cases, however, is that as mentioned above, none of the
courts initiated their inquiry by first determining whether a product
mining what constitutes the reasonable expectation of the consumer): Jackson v. Gen. Mo-
tors Corp., 60 S.W.3d 800, 806 (Tenn. 2001) (determining that consumers may form
reasonable expectations of a vehicle safety restraint system).
45. Yong Cha Hong v. Marriot Corp., 656 F. Supp. 445, 449 (D. Md. 1987) (stating
that the "jury must determine whether a piece of fast food fried chicken is merchantable if
it contains an inedible item of the chicken's anatomy"); Cain v. Sheraton Perimeter Park S.
Hotel, 592 So. 2d 218, 221 (Ala. 1991) (stating that whether a patron should reasonably
have expected that raw oysters may have been contaminated is a question of fact); Zabner
v. Howard Johnson's, Inc., 201 So. 2d 824, 828 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (stating that the
jury should determine "what is reasonably expected by the consumer" in cases dealing with
"the question of whether food is fit for the purpose intended"): Goodman v. Wenco Foods,
Inc., 423 S.E.2d 444, 451 (N.C. 1992) (stating that, under the reasonable expectation test,
whether a bone fragment in a hamburger is to be reasonably expected is a jury question):
Williams v. Braum Ice Cream Stores. Inc., 534 P.2d 700. 702 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (stating
that "[wlhat should be reasonably expected by the consumer is a jury question"): Jim
Dandy Fast Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter, 535 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1976, no writ) (deciding that whether a chicken bone is to be reasonably expected is
a question for the jury).
46. Civitello v. Burger King Corp.. No.UWYCV990152575. 2002 WL 241491. at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2002).
47. Livingston v. Marie Callender's, Inc.. 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528. 529-31 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that actual or constructive knowledge of potential risk is required before
imposing strict liability for failure to warn).
48. Ayala v. Bartolome, 940 S.W.2d 727. 731 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997. no pet.) (de-
claring that raw oysters tainted with vibrio vulnificus bacteria are products subject to Sec-
tion 402A).
49. Hickman v. Win. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 768 So. 2d 812, 814 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
50. Knight v. Just Born, Inc., No. CV-99-606-ST, 2000 WL 924624, at *3 (D. Or. Mar.
28, 2000).
51. Almquist v. Finley Sch. Dist. No. 53, 57 P.3d 1191, 1193 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
52. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
53. Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc.. 588 P.2d 233, 234 (Wash. 1978).
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was the subject matter of the controversy. Instead, the courts fol-
lowed the previously mentioned policy-based technique. This pro-
cess has also been true in cases involving animals.
III. CASES INVOLVING ANIMALS
Strict liability as applied to animals is not a new phenomenon.54
The concept has been invoked in any one of three distinct scena-
rios. One centers upon animals that possess distinct barnyard char-
acteristics and that trespass upon the land of another.55 The second
involves domesticated animals with known vicious tendencies,56
and the third includes animals that are described as being ferae
naturae, or those whose natural habitat is in the wild. 57 The law has
54. See May v. Burdett, 115 Eng. Rep. 1213, 1217 (Q.B. 1846) (stating that "[a] person
who keeps an animal accustomed to attack and bite mankind, with knowledge that it is so
accustomed, is prima facie liable in an action on the case at the suit of any person attacked
and injured by such animal, without any averment in the declaration of negligence or de-
fault in the securing or taking care of it"): see also Heald v. Grier. 12 Mo. App. 556. 557-58
(Mo. App. Ct. 1882) (citing that the owner of trespassing livestock was strictly liable for
damage); Anita Bernstein. How Can a Product Be Liable?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1, 43 (1995)
(citing Mosaic law which provided that the owner of an ox which gored a person would be
liable if the owner knew of the ox's propensities).
55. See Williams v. Goodwin, 116 Cal. Rptr. 200, 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (holding the
owner of a trespassing bull that inflicted personal injury to be strictly liable); Campbell v.
White, 357 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Ky. 1962) (imposing liability against the owner of a boar hog
that injured the plaintiff while on the plaintiff's porch); Till v. Bennet, 281 N.W.2d 276. 278
(S.D. 1979) (stating that an animal's owner is strictly liable for damages caused by trespass-
ing animals). When a collision between an automobile and grazing animals occurs on a
public highway, strict liability is usually not a means for recovery, and the injured motorist
must proceed on a theory of actionable negligence. See Vanderwater v. Hatch, 835 F.2d
239, 242 (10th Cir. 1987) (upholding an Equal Protection Clause challenge of a Utah stat-
ute that imposes strict liability for animal trespass to private property, but does not provide
for strict liability when the injury occurs on public property): Byram v. Main, 523 A.2d
1387, 1388-89 (Me. 1987) (stating that the owner of donkey involved with the collision of a
vehicle on the highway is not strictly liable).
56. See Poznanski ex rel. Poznanski v. Horvath, 788 N.E.2d 1255. 1259 (Ind. 2003)
(requiring knowledge of a dog's vicious propensities before imposing strict liability): Doyle
v. Monroe County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n, 758 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003)
(holding that a horse is a domesticated animal, therefore the owner is only liable when
vicious tendencies are known); Jackson v. Mateus, 70 P.3d 78, 83 (Utah 2003) (stating that
a cat owner is not liable because the vicious propensities were unknown to the owner).
57. See Burns v. Gleason, 819 F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding the owner of a
jaguar strictly liable); Gallick v. Barto, 828 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (applying
Pennsylvania law to hold an owner of a ferret liable); Rosenbloom v. Hanour Corp., 78
Cal. Rptr. 2d 686, 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that the keeper of a shark may be
subject to strict liability) Scorza v. Martinez, 683 So. 2d 1115, 1116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (holding the owner of monkey strictly liable for inflicted injuries): Johnson v. Swain.
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never hesitated to impose strict liability in these cases. In fact, it is
one of the seven areas of the law wherein strict liability has been
traditionally applied. 8 The rationale or justification for so doing,
however, varied slightly in each instance. For example, when tres-
passing livestock invaded another's land and destroyed their crops
or other means of livelihood, the law imposed liability by reasoning
that the individuals should control their animals, and if they failed
to do so, should be held responsible.59 In the case of animals with
vicious tendencies, whether domesticated or those which were nor-
787 S.W.2d 36, 37 (Tex. 1989) (holding the owner liable to a plaintiff gored by an elephant);
Hudson v. Janesville Conservation Club, 484 N.W.2d 132, 133 (Wis. 1992) (holding the
owner of a buck deer liable for injury caused by the animal). The Scorza court further
states that once possession of the animal has changed, the plaintiff may not recover on a
strict liability theory against the original owner. Scorza, 683 So. 2d at 1116.
58. Strict liability has traditionally been applied in seven different categories. The
first is the category of trespassing and vicious animals. See Lindsay v. Cobb, 627 P.2d 349,
350 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (holding an owner strictly liable when an animal trespasses on an
enclosed fence); May v. Burdett, 115 Eng. Rep. 1213, 1213 (Q.B. 1846) (holding that an
owner of an animal with known propensities to attack mankind will be held liable for
failing to secure such animal). Second is abnormally dangerous activities. See Fletcher v.
Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 740-41 (Q.B. 1865) (stating that "[a] person who collects on
his land a dangerous element, be it fire or water, and allows it to escape and injure his
neighbour's land, is liable for the consequences"). Third is libel. See E. Hulton Co. &
Jones, [1910] A.C. 20, 23 (H.L. 1909) (appeal taken from Eng.) (explaining that a person
charged with libel may not defend himself on the grounds that he intended not to defame
the plaintiff ... if in fact the statement was untrue, he has no defense however good his
intentions were). The fourth category is trespass. See Burns Philp Food, Inc. v. Cavalea
Cont'l Freight, Inc., No. 99-2182, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21583, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 3.
1999) (stating that trespass is a strict liability tort and needs no further discussion). Fifth is
vicarious liability. See Oke Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 298 F.3d 768, 775 (9th
Cir. 2002) (stating that vicarious liability is a form of strict liability because it is unjust to
allow an employer to gain from the cooperation of others without being responsible for its
mistakes). The sixth category is nuisance. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United
States. 271 F.3d 1327, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the instigator of nuisance, either
public or private, may be held strictly liable for injury). Seventh is misrepresentation. See
Herzog v. Arthrocare Corp., No.-02-76-P-C, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5224, at *16 (D. Me.
Mar. 21, 2003) (explaining that a strict liability misrepresentation claim could not require
constructive or actual knowledge of the misrepresentation).
59. See Byram v. Main, 523 A.2d 1387, 1390 (Me. 1987) (explaining that strict liability
for trespass of animals protects the rights of the possessor of land to maintain exclusive
control); Carver v. Ford, 591 P.2d 305, 308-09 (Okla. 1979) (determining that when an
owner allows an animal to run at large, the owner is responsible for damages done during
trespass); Note, Liability for Harm Caused by Livestock, 34 IOWA L. REV. 318, 320 (1949)
(explaining early English imposition of strict liability). The early English courts imposed
strict liability on the owner of trespassing livestock on the premise that "a man [who] tres-
passes with his beasts is liable as though he committed the trespass personally." Id.
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mally wild, knowledge of the animal's potential for harm could be
expected, and therefore strict liability would be the result.
60
Strict products liability, however, is different. In this instance,
we require that liability be imposed because one has introduced a
defective product,6' which is unreasonably dangerous,62 into the
60. See Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 651-54 (1878) (stating that owners are liable,
without knowledge of violent propensities, if an animal is inherently vicious; but if the
animal is of a tame nature, the owner must have knowledge of violent propensities); Burns
v. Gleason, 819 F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that "absolute liability applies to
keepers of wild animals," while a lesser standard of strict liability or negligence applies to
keepers of domesticated animals): Hays v. Miller, 43 So. 818, 819 (Ala. 1907) (explaining
that the owner of a wild wolf is presumed to have conclusive knowledge of the animal's
vicious propensities); Rolen v. Maryland Cas. Co., 240 So. 2d 42, 44 (La. Ct. App. 1970)
(holding that wild animals are "inherently dangerous and, therefore, anyone who owns one
does so at his own peril and is absolutely liable for all injuries"). See generally 4 AM. JUR.
2D Animals § 93 (1995) (stating that a wild beast is presumed to be dangerous, and if the
animal is not securely confined, security must be assured under all circumstances).
61. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1964) (ruling
that a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort after placing a defective product in the stream
of commerce); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 385-86 (Tex.
1991) (stating that there is no duty to warn of possible prolonged effects of alcohol con-
sumption); Sims v. Washex, Mach. Corp., 932 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1995, no writ) (noting that a product may be defective if it is unreasonably dangerous
as manufactured, designed, or contains inadequate warnings or instructions), RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965) (describing a defective product as defec-
tive if it "leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer"): see also Charles E. Cantu. Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability for
Ultra-Hazardous Activities from Strict Products Liability Under Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts: Two Parallel Lines of Reasoning That Should Never Meet, 35 AK-
RON L. REV. 31, 44-45 (2001) (discussing the scope of defects to generally include products
which are mis-designed, mis-manufactured, or mis-marketed); David A. Fischer, Products
Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 342 (1974) (noting the introduction
of a product).
62. See Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 260 F.3d 837, 841 (8th Cir.
2001) (citing Arkansas Code Section 4-68-102, stating that a product is unreasonably dan-
gerous when it is dangerous to an extent beyond what was contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it. with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
its characteristics): Bergfield v. Unimin Corp.. 226 F. Supp. 2d 970. 976-77 (N.D. Iowa
2002) (noting that an unreasonably dangerous product must cause injury when used in the
way it was intended to be used or consumed): Dillon v. Zeneca Corp., 42 P.3d 598, 603
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a product may be unreasonably dangerous because of a
manufacturing defect, design defect, or an informational defect (citing Gosewisch v. Am.
Honda Motor Co. 737 P.2d 376, 379 (Ariz. 1987))); see also Robert F. Thompson, The
Arkansas Products Liability Statute: What Does "Unreasonably Dangerous" Mean in Ar-
kansas?, 50 ARK. L. REV. 663, 666-68 (1998) (defining unreasonably dangerous). The au-
thor states that with respect to design defects, courts have approached the question of
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous from two directions. Id. First, courts and
some state legislatures have adopted a "risk-utility" test, which requires a plaintiff to show
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stream of commerce. This begs the question: how can an animal be
considered a product? The problem can be illustrated by taking
the typical household pet into consideration. Whether Rex the dog
or Tabby the cat, each is endowed with its own personality; rarely if
ever is there any uniformity. If we consider tales of the heinous
puppy farms where cages are periodically moved, and breeding
takes on the characteristics of a breeding assembly line, one could
reason that we do in fact have a product. In fact, this line of rea-
soning was employed in early cases involving the construction of
homes, where courts apparently have taken notice of this assembly
line process.6 3 One can drive into a new development, and in the
first block find row after row of foundations. On the second, one
will find foundations and sides. On the third, foundations, sides,
and roofs. And on the fourth, foundations, sides, roofs, and inte-
rior work being finished out. During the 1960s, when strict prod-
ucts liability law was evolving, courts were quick to reason that in
these cases an assembly line process was being utilized, and we
should therefore consider the finished home as a product.64
As to animals, however, whether the subject matter is a pet
puppy,6 5 skunk,66 hamster,67 or a baby pig used for research, 68 the
that a safer design existed that would have prevented the plaintiff's injury. Id. Second,
some courts have adopted a "consumer expectation" standard, which compares the quality
of the product to what a reasonable consumer would have expected. Id.
63. See Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)
(seeing no meaningful distinction between mass production of homes, automobiles, and
airplanes): Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.. 207 A.2d 314, 321 (N.J. 1965) (seeing no mean-
ingful distinction between mass production of homes and mass production of automobiles).
64. See Blass v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 323-24 (Ark. 1981) (noting that a
home is a product): Salka v. Dean Homes of Beverly Hills. Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902. 909
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (noting mass production of homes as a product): Schipper v. Levitt &
Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 323-24 (N.J. 1965) (classifying homes as products): see also Bas-
tian v. Wausau Homes. Inc., 620 F. Supp. 947. 950 (N.D. Il1. 1985) (holding that strict
liability is a recovery theory for damages resulting from mass-produced homes); Berman v.
Watergate West. Inc.. 391 A.2d 1351. 1357 (D.C. 1978) (ruling that mass-produced homes
are considered products protected by strict liability); Papp v. Rocky Mountain Oil & Min-
eral Co., 769 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Mont. 1989) (holding that buildings are not products, but
strict liability is available for mass produced buildings).
65. Worrell v. Sachs, 563 A.2d 1387, 1387-89 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that a
diseased animal is a product under Connecticut product liability laws). The Worrell court
concluded that the existence of a disease at the time of purchase renders the live animal
defective. Id. Had the disease been of the nature that the incubatory period may have
given rise to the inference that the disease was not present in the animal at the time of the
transaction, then the animal would still have been a product under Connecticut law, but at
the time of the transaction the animal would not have been defective. Id.
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courts have not invoked this assembly line reasoning. If the animal
in question is in some way diseased or in any other way varies from
the norm, the courts have in some cases reached the conclusion
that those sustaining harm may proceed on the basis of strict prod-
ucts liability.6 9 By necessity, we once again have ended with an
odd result: animals, like food, can in some instances constitute a
product.
This same conclusion has been reached in other cases wherein
the subject matter in controversy is quite varied. Whether con-
cerned with telephone poles,70 balloons,71 paving stones,72 baptis-
mal font heaters,73 video games," or ice,75 the result has been the
66. See Sease v. Taylor's Pets, Inc., 700 P.2d 1054, 1057-58 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (dis-
agreeing with the Illinois position that animals are not products because of their
mutability).
67. See Beyer v. Aquarium Supply Co.. 404 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1977)
(holding that "there is no reason why a breeder, distributor or vendor who places a dis-
eased animal in the stream of commerce should be less accountable for his actions than
one who markets a defective manufactured product").
68. See Anderson v. Farmers Hybrid Co., 408 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (I11. App. Ct. 1980)
(holding that baby pigs sold for breeding purposes were not products under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts Section 402A because of mutative ability).
69. See Worrell, 563 A.2d at 1388 (supporting the proposition that the sale of a dis-
eased animal warrants recovery under a strict liability theory); Beyer, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 778-
89 (allowing recovery in a cause of action in strict products liability against the distributor
of hamsters to recover for illness suffered by the plaintiff after coming in contact with
allegedly diseased hamsters distributed by the defendant): Sease, 700 P.2d at 1058 (holding
that a live skunk was a product under the meaning of the state products liability statute).
The Worrell, Sease, and Beyer opinions ail focus on the condition of the animal at the time
of purchase, not the ability of the animal to contract an illness subsequent to the purchase
of the animal. In all three decisions, the diseased animal was infected at the time of the
transaction, thus creating the defect in the animal. But see Anderson, 408 N.E.2d at 1199
(holding that natural immutability is essential to determining whether a product exists).
70. Bell v. T.R. Miller Mill Co., 768 So. 2d 953, 957 (Ala. 2000) (holding that a tele-
phone pole installed in the ground does not lose its characteristics as a product).
71. Jaimes v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 301, 304-05 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist]
1999, pet. denied) (hearing a claim alleging that a retailer was liable under a strict products
liability theory for selling a defectively designed balloon to a minor). The Jaimes court
affirmed the summary judgment for the retailer because the plaintiff could not establish
the requisite elements of products liability. Id. at 306.
72. Cecil v. T.M.E. Invs., Inc., 893 S.W.2d 38, 50 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no
writ) (affirming the lower court's finding that a coping stone manufacturer was not liable
under a marketing defect theory).
73. Mount Olivet Tabernacle Church v. Edwin L. Weigand Div., 781 A.2d 1263, 1266
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (affirming judgment for the plaintiff in a products liability case based
on a defective heater in a church's baptismal font).
74. See Roccaforte v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 802 So. 2d 764 766 (La. Ct. App. 2001)
(implying that a video game is a product as the court's language proceeds under a typical
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same. We are dealing with products, and as a consequence, the
issue becomes readily apparent. If the courts are going to adopt a
policy-based technique, what factors should they consider?
IV. FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN EMPLOYING
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
One of the original justifications for adopting Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts was that it was consumer
friendly.76 Prior to its enactment, the plaintiff in products liability
litigation was limited to a recovery based upon actionable negli-
gence 77 or warranty, 78 and the hurdles that had to be overcome in
products liability analysis). But see James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 701 (6th Cir.
2002) (extending a prior holding that board games were not products subject to strict prod-
ucts liability to current case that video games were also not products subject to the same
scrutiny under Kentucky law); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 173-74
(D. Conn. 2002) (holding that a video game is not a product); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't,
Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 (D. Colo. 2002) (declaring that video games are not prod-
ucts under products liability litigation).
75. Hebert v. Loveless, 474 S.W.2d 732, 739 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (addressing a products liability claim where the alleged defective product was ice).
76. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 474 (Cal. 1988) (clarifying that strict
liability focuses not on the conduct of the manufacturer, but on the product itself); Barker
v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) (noting that strict liability is designed to
relieve plaintiffs of the "onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of
action"); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should preclude a plaintiff
from needing to prove negligence when the producer actively knows that the product the
consumer purchases will not be inspected after manufacturing); Robertson v. Gulf South
Beverages, Inc., 421 So. 2d 877. 880 (La. 1982) (identifying that the strict liability doctrine
provided plaintiffs with a rebuttable presumption that the injury resulted from the defec-
tive design): see also Anita Bernstein & Paul Fanning, "Weightier Than a Mountain": Duty,
Hierarchy, and the Consumer in Japan, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 60 (1996) (stating
that ultimately. all products are alike, and that products liability based on strict liability
places consumers on the same legal foundation as the manufacturers): James A. Hender-
son, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate Ration-
ality. 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765. 769 n.14 (1983) (commenting that it is easier for an injured
plaintiff to prove that a product caused his injury than to prove that the manufacturer was
negligent in the manufacturing process).
77. See Kyle v. Swift & Co., 229 F.2d 887, 889 (4th Cir. 1956) (asserting that a manu-
facturer can be held liable for negligence if the claim is supported by sufficient evidence);
Mushatt v. Page Milk Co., 262 So. 2d 520, 523 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (addressing a claim for
injuries resulting from a foreign substance in a can of milk under the negligence theory);
Gramex Corp. v. Green Supply, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (noting that
initially, liability hinged on negligence); see also Webster v. Pacesetter Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d
27, 38 (D.D.C. 2003) (asserting that in order to succeed in a products liability claim based
on negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant did not act with due care); Con-
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dos v. Musculoskeletal Transplant Found., 208 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Utah 2002) (en-
forcing that the plaintiff could proceed on a negligence theory against a blood supplier);
Hanus v. Tex. Utils. Co., 71 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (ana-
lyzing the plaintiff's case on a negligence basis). The following cases illustrate how a con-
sumer's recovery for a defective product has shifted from a negligence-based claim to a
cause of action under strict liability. Compare Tuttle v. U.S. Slicing Mach. Co., 335 F.2d 63,
64 (4th Cir. 1964) (agreeing that a plaintiff injured by a meat grinder may proceed under a
negligence theory), and Gibbs v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 201 N.E.2d 473, 478 (I11.
App. Ct. 1964) (holding that the manufacturer was not liable for injuries caused by washing
solution in the absence of privity). and Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 138 S.E.2d 753.
754 (N.C. 1964) (indicating that authorities hold that a plaintiff suing a manufacturer of
food products intended for human consumption must proceed under the theory of negli-
gence), and Lewis v. U.S. Rubber Co., 202 A.2d 20, 23 (Pa. 1964) (limiting the party in-
jured in a tire blowout to a claim of negligence against the tire manufacturer), and
Producers Chem. Co. v. Stamps, 380 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (affirming that a plaintiff injured by an exploding air compressor may recover under
negligence theory), with Henry v. Firestone/Bridgestone Inc., No. 02-3347, 2003 WL
2013051, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Apr. 29, 2003) (permitting recovery for an injury resulting from a
defective tire under strict products liability), and Messer v. Amway Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d
1217. 1236 (D. Kan. 2002) (determining that an injury resulting from a floor stripper may
allow recovery under strict liability theory), and Simeon v. Doe, 618 So. 2d 848, 850-51 (La.
1993) (noting that a manufacturer of food products was liable under a strict products liabil-
ity theory), and Arnold v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 908 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(contending that a plaintiff injured by an exploding air compressor may proceed under
strict products liability), and Bleh v. Biro Mfg. Co., 756 N.E.2d 121, 124 (Ohio Ct. App.
2001) (per curiam) (allowing a plaintiff injured by a meat grinder to proceed under strict
products liability).
78. See Martel v. Duffy-Mott Corp., 166 N.W.2d 541,545 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (al-
lowing the plaintiff to proceed on a breach of implied warranty theory against a food man-
ufacturer): Metty v. Shurfine Cent. Corp.. 736 S.W.2d 527. 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (per
curiam) (noting that warranty exists even where there is no privity); Welch v. Schiebelhuth.
169 N.Y.S.2d 309, 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957) (rejecting the privity requirement in a breach of
warranty claim); Ayala v. Bartolome, 940 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1997, no
pet.) (addressing Texas's view on public policy imposing implied warranty for unwhole-
some food not fit for human consumption). The following cases illustrate the shift from a
claim under breach of warranty to a cause under strict liability theory. Compare Chaira-
luce v. Stanley Warner Mgmt. Co., 236 F. Supp. 385. 387 (D. Conn. 1965) (holding that a
plaintiff may proceed against shoe manufacturer under breach of warranty theory), and
Wagner v. Mars, Inc., 166 So. 2d 673. 675 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (upholding that a
consumer injured by nails in a candy bar may recover under breach of warranty theory),
and Hardman v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 198 N.E.2d 681, 691 (I11. App. Ct. 1964) (pro-
viding that a plaintiff burned by a fire fueled by hairspray may recover under the theory of
breach of warranty), and Amarillo Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hall. 384 S.W.2d 726. 728
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1964, no pet.) (allowing a plaintiff injured from an exploding soda
bottle to recover under the theory of breach of warranty), with Tucker v. Nike, Inc., 919 F.
Supp. 1192, 1195 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (providing that an injured plaintiff may proceed against
a shoe manufacturer on grounds of strict liability), and Nowak v. Faberge, U.S.A., Inc., 812
F. Supp. 492, 496 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (concluding that a plaintiff injured by a hairspray-fueled
fire may recover under strict products liability), and Lia v. Domain Mumm, Inc., No.
B157434, 2003 WL 21260710, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 2, 2003) (holding that a plaintiff
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each are legendary. Negligence required proof of lack of ordinary
care 79 and proximate cause,8" both of which were questions of fact
for the jury. The three main warranties given to us by the Uniform
Commercial Code81 were direct enough, but the downside was that
they could in some instances be disclaimed,82 and sellers could in-
injured from an exploding champagne bottle may recover under the theory of strict liabil-
ity), and Gates v. Standard Brands, Inc., 719 P.2d 130,134 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (favoring
the view that a consumer injured by snake vertebrae in a candy bar may proceed under
strict products liability)..
79. See Garrett v. Hamilton Standard Controls. Inc., 850 F.2d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1988)
(noting that a negligence analysis looks at the acts of the manufacturer and determines if
the manufacturer exercised ordinary care); Jones v. Amazing Prods., Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d
1228, 1238 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (affirming that in negligence cases, the defendant's actions are
judged by the standards of reasonable care); Cervelli v. Thompson/Center Arms, Inc., 183
F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1040 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (asserting that a manufacturer knew or should
have known of risk by exercising ordinary care); Davis v. Blockbuster, Inc., 575 S.E.2d 1, 2
(Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (confirming that a legal duty to exercise ordinary care arises in the
presence of foreseeable risk); Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551, 552 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (recognizing that a pharmacist owes duty of ordinary care in practicing his profes-
sion); Ridgeway v. Ford Motor Co., 82 S.W.3d 26, 32 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet.
granted) (stating that in a negligent manufacturing claim, courts look at the acts of manu-
facturer to determine if it exercised ordinary care).
80. See Timmons v. Ford Motor Co., 982 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (arguing
that the design of the automobile was not the proximate cause of the crash where the
driver was driving in excess of 100 miles per hour); Winnet v. Winnet, 310 N.E.2d 1, 4 (IlI.
1974) (stating that legal proximate cause extends only to those to whom injury from a
defective product may be reasonably foreseen); Skinner v. Square D Co., 516 N.W.2d 475,
479 (Mich. 1994) (explaining that proximate cause involves "examining the foreseeability
of consequences, and whether defendant should be held legally [liable] for such conse-
quences"): Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995) (explaining the
difference between the proximate cause test of actionable negligence and the producing
cause test of strict liability). Both tests employ causation in fact and both require the de-
fendant's conduct or product to be a substantial factor in bringing about injury. Union
Pump Co., 898 S.W2d at 775. However, proximate cause consists of an element of foresee-
ability as a limitation, whereas producing cause is "an efficient, exciting, or contributing
cause, which in a natural sequence. produced injuries or damages complained of." Id.; see
also Skeie v. Mercer Trucking Co.. 61 P.3d 1207. 1209 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (asserting that
the determination of legal causation rests on policy considerations as to how far the legal
consequences of a defendant's act should extend).
81. See U.C.C. § 2-312 (2002) (providing a warranty of legitimate title from seller to
buyer with regards to goods purchased); id. § 2-314 (stating that a warranty that goods shall
be merchantable is implied in the contract for goods if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind); id. § 2-315 (outlining a warranty that goods are fit for a particular
purpose).
82. See Hininger v. Case Corp., 23 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that the Texas
implied "warranty of merchantability may be disclaimed" if it is in writing, is conspicuous,
and specifically mentions the word "merchantability"); Rynders v. E.I. Du Pont, De
Nemours & Co.. 21 F.3d 835, 840 (8th Cir. 1994) (declaring that "South Dakota requires
disclaimers to set out with particularity the characters of fitness being waived"); Bowdoin
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sert a limitation as to their liability. 3 These factors, plus the cost of
litigation, made recovery in many instances very difficult.8 4 It was
at this point that strict products liability entered the arena, and the
basis for recovery was greatly simplified. The plaintiff was re-
quired to establish that the product was defective at the time it was
v. Showell Growers, Inc.. 817 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that a post-sale
disclaimer is not effective because it did not form part of the basis of the bargain between
the parties to the sale); 2000 Watermark Ass'n Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183, 1186
(4th Cir. 1986) (explaining that tort law assigns risk as a matter of law- therefore risk can-
not be as easily disclaimed in a tort action); Williams v. Gradall Co.. 990 F. Supp. 442. 445
(E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that Virginia law allows a seller to disclaim a warranty, but not
upon delivery of goods, without an agreed modification of the contract); Richard O'Brien
Co. v. Challenge-Cook Bros., 672 F. Supp. 466, 470 (D. Colo. 1987) (claiming that the
Colorado implied warranty of merchantability may be disclaimed if it is in writing, is con-
spicuous, and uses the word merchantability): Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp.,
445 F. Supp. 507, 516 (D. Me. 1977) (asserting that warranty disclaimer in larger type ex-
cludes all other warranties according to U.C.C. § 2-316(2)); Westfield Ins. Co. v. HULS
Am.. Inc.. 714 N.E.2d 934. 949 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (arguing that a party may limit or
disclaim an implied warranty provided the disclaimer is not unconscionable): E.L. Smith v.
Radam, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 2001, no pet.) (determin-
ing that large, conspicuous "AS IS" effectively disclaimed all U.C.C. implied warranties).
83. See Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta. 288 F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2002) (explain-
ing that under New Jersey law, a seller can limit its liability to a third party beneficiary by
disclaimers in its agreements with its immediate purchaser); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Air-
motive, Inc., 499 F. 2d 709, 710 (10th Cir. 1974) (stating that parties on equal bargaining
footing may contractually disclaim implied warranties); Schlenz v. John Deer Co., 511 F.
Supp. 224, 229 (D. Mont. 1981) (ruling that parties are free to limit or exclude consequent-
ial damages "unless the limitation is unconscionable") Hauter v. Zogarts, 120 Cal. Rptr.
681, 690 (Cal. 1975) (declaring that a warranty may not be modified or disclaimed unless a
seller clearly limits his liability); McCarty v. E.J. Korvette. Inc., 347 A.2d 253, 259 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1975) (limiting liability from a tire blowout to the replacement value and ex-
cluding consequential damages) Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 324 N.E.2d 583, 587
(Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (arguing that a written contract may limit liability, but the limitation
clause must be in writing and conspicuous); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 2304(a)(2) (1982)
(prohibiting a supplier from "impos[ing] any limitation on the duration of any implied
warranty on the product").
84. See John G. Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 44 LA. L. REv. 1193, 1207 (1984)
(arguing that "[t]he most formidable criticism that can be levied against the tort system is
its inordinate expense"): Marc Galanter. Reading the Landscape of Dispute: What We
Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litig-
iouls Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 15 (1983) (discussing the factors that prevent consumers
from pursuing a claim, including high litigation costs): Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs
and the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111, 113 (1991) (stating that
many plaintiffs do not sue because recovery amounts will not exceed litigation costs): see
also Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability
and Under Negligence, 10 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 164 (1990) (proposing that "the
social cost generated by the injurer's failure to [exercise] care is the sum of the expected
loss imposed on a victim and the litigation costs imposed on society").
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introduced into the stream of commerce,85 that this defect was at-
tributable to the defendant,86 and that the defect caused the injury
85. See Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
"[u]nder Indiana law, manufacturers are strictly liable [for] injuries incurred as a result of
placing defective product in stream of commerce"); Cantrell v. Weber-Stephen Prods. Co.,
No. 01-0145, 2002 WL 1370671, at *2 (4th Cir. June 26, 2002) (affirming the lower court
finding that circumstantial evidence alone is usually not enough to establish defect); Long
v. Cottrell, Inc., 265 F.3d 663, 669 (8th Cir. 2001) (declaring that Missouri law requires an
entity to place a product in the stream of commerce before it can be held strictly liable);
Hittle v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 159, 168 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (asserting that
"strict products liability is premised on the concept of enterprise liability for casting a de-
fective product into the stream of commerce"); Civitello v. Burger King Corp., No.
UWYCV990152575, 2002 WL 241491, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2002) (concerning a
patron of a fast food restaurant who was injured by foodstuff placed in the stream of com-
merce); Edwards v. Campbell Taggart Baking Cos., 466 S.E.2d 911, 912 (Ga. Ct. App.
1996) (stating that in the absence of direct evidence of the unwholesomeness of food, re-
covery could be supported by circumstantial evidence which eliminates every other possi-
bility that could have caused the plaintiff's illness): Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co.,
620 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Iowa 2000) (concluding that an assembler who incorporates a defec-
tive component part into the final product is liable by placing the product in the stream of
commerce); Durden v. Hydro Flame Corp., 983 P.2d 943, 948 (Mont. 1999) (explaining that
the policy behind strict liability is imposition of liability to one who places a defective
product in the stream of commerce); Becker v. Tessitore. 812 A.2d 369. 380 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002) (describing that placing a product in the stream of commerce requires
relinquishing possession); Crane Carrier Co. v. Bostrom Seating, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 153, 157
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. filed) (concluding that a "defendant is held liable
based on proof that it placed the product into the stream of commerce"); Kemp v. Miller,
453 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Wis. 1990) (applying strict products liability to lessors on the premise
that the risk of loss should be borne by those who place a product in the stream of
commerce).
86. See Riley v. De'Longhi Corp., No. 99-2305, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27082, at *4
(4th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000) (addressing Maryland law that requires the defect to be attributable
to the defendant); Gebhart v. Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180. 184 (D. Ariz. 2003) (com-
menting that the plaintiff must prove that the defect existed at the time the product left the
defendant's possession): Levine v. Sears Roebuck & Co.. 200 F. Supp. 2d 180. 191
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the -seller's liability is generally limited to defects attributa-
ble [at] the time of sale"): Rodriguez v. Nat'l Detroit, Inc.. No. 3D02-1674. 2003 WL
21658249. at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 16. 2003) (proclaiming that a plaintiff must show
that his or her injuries were the result of a defective product): Holloway v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 271 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Mich. 1978) (commenting that where failure is in an inaccessi-
ble part of the product, it is reasonable to infer that a defect is attributable to the manufac-
turer); Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 545 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(agreeing that to recover under the theory of strict liability, the plaintiff's injury must be
attributed to the defect in the product) see also AM. L. PROD. LIAB. 3D § 3:12 (Timothy E.
Travers et al. eds., 1987) (recognizing that the product must have contained the defect
while the defendant was in possession of the product): PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (W. Page Keeton ed., 1984) (stating that a plaintiff must establish
some connection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs injury).
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of which he was complaining.87 It is easy to see why plaintiffs were
eager to pursue their causes of action under this new theory. Once
a defect was established, the rest could almost always be proved by
circumstantial evidence.88 Much has been written on the issue of
defect and the various formulas89 for establishing whether the
87. See Yakovich v. Smart & Final, Inc., No. 02-16212, 2003 WL 21480285. at *1 (9th
Cir. June 20, 2003) (reiterating that an inadequate warning label was not the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury); Miller v. Uniroyal Tech. Corp., No. 00-4559. 2002 WL
1042112, at *3 (6th Cir. May 22, 2002) (noting that the injury must be proximately caused
by the defect); Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2001) (claiming that the
accident pump supplied by the defendant was defective and resulted in her finger being
amputated); Tavacs v. Minimed Techs., No. 98-3774, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16113, at *7
(E.D. La. Oct. 15, 1999) (restating that the defective product must be the cause of the
plaintiff's injury); Smock Materials Handling Co. v. Kerr, 719 N.E.2d 396, 403 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999) (concluding that strong evidence that non-movable parts had in fact moved led
to the conclusion that a defect existed): Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602. 610
(Iowa 2000) (stating that the fire alarm should have sounded when flames reached it, and
thus caused the injuries in question): Evans v. Mellott Mfg., Inc., No. 98CA838, 2000 Ohio
App. LEXIS 2824, at *25 (Ohio Ct. App. June 15, 2000) (concluding that whether the
design was defective is a question of fact): Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez. 977
S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tex. 1998) (restating the jury's finding that the defect in the tire was a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury): Crane Carrier Co. v. Bostrom Seating, Inc., 89
S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (explaining that the defendant
is liable upon proof that the defective product was the cause of the claimant's damages).
88. See McCoy v. Whirlpool Corp., No. Civ. A. 02-2064-KHV, 2003 WL 21554950, at
*7 (D. Kan. July 8, 2003) (allowing circumstantial evidence to prove defect): Cansler v.
Mills, 765 N.E.2d 698, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to establish a defect): Kenkel v. Stanley Works, 665 N.W.2d 490. 498 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2003) (declaring that both direct and circumstantial evidence may be used to prove
that a defect existed); Nelson v. Wilkens Dodge, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 472, 476 (Minn. 1977)
(holding that a defective condition can be proved by circumstantial evidence): Daniels v.
Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the exis-
tence of a defect may be inferred from circumstantial evidence); Speller ex rel. Miller v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 N.E.2d 252, 254 (N.Y. 2003) (stating that "a plaintiff 'is not
required to prove the specific defect' and that '[p]roof of necessary facts may be circum-
stantial"' (quoting Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 625 (N.Y. 1973))): DeWitt v. Eve-
ready Battery Co.. 565 S.E.2d 140. 151 (N.C. 2002) (explaining that genuine issues of fact
exist if the plaintiff raises sufficient circumstantial evidence of a defect): State Farm Cas. v.
Black & Decker. Inc., No. 79573, 2002 WL 31398693, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2002)
(stating that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove defect): Beatty v. Ford Motor
Co., 574 S.E.2d 803, 807 (W. Va. 2002) (allowing the plaintiff to prove the defect
circumstantially).
89. See Epler v. Jansport. Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-CV-154, 2001 WL 179862, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 22, 2001) (providing guidance for a risk/utility analysis). According to the Epler
court, Pennsylvania considers seven factors in determining whether a product is in a defec-
tive condition:
1. [U]tility to the user and the public ...
2. [L]ikelihood that it will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury;
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product is in a defective condition because of mis-design, 90 mis-
assembly, 91 or mis-marketing,92 and the subject need not be ex-
3. [A]vailability of a [s]afer substitute;
4. [M]anufacturer's ability to [cost effectively] eliminate unsafe character of the
product
5. [U]ser's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care [and] use ...
6. [U]ser's anticipated awareness of the [inherent] dangers...;
7. [F]easibility [of manufacturer] to sprea[d] the loss by . . . price . . . or carrying
liability insurance.
ld.: see also Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116. 125 (Cal. 2001) (describing a product as
defective if "the product has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
expect . . . or if ... the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the [inherent]
risk[s] of [the] ... design"); McCabe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 309-
12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining the California approach to determining if a design
defect exists). The McCabe court speaks of a bifurcated test to determine the existence of
a design defect. McCabe, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309-12. A product may be deemed defec-
tively designed if it fails the consumer expectation test. Id. at 309-10. In addition, even
though the product meets the consumer's expectation, it may still be deemed defective if it
fails the risk-benefit test with a finding that the product poses an "excessive preventable
danger." Id. at 309-10; see also Charles E. Cantu, Twenty Five Years of Strict Products
Liability Law: The Transformation and Present Meaning of Section 402A, 25 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 327, 334-36 (1993) (listing several of the various tests courts have employed to deter-
mine if product is defective: (1) reasonable expectation test (2) reasonably prudent manu-
facturer test; (3) whether a product in unreasonably dangerous and; (4) the risk/utility
balancing test).
90. See Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 2003) (alleging that a hip
prosthetic is defective because of its design): Brizendine v. Visador Co., 437 F.2d 822, 825
(9th Cir. 1970) (claiming that a pane of glass was defective because it did not fall within the
acceptable thickness range); Tracy v. Finn Equip. Co.. 310 F.2d 436, 437 (6th Cir. 1962)
(claiming a mulcher machine was defective because it lacked a device to stop the blade
while the maintenance door was open); McCoy, 2003 WL 21554950, at *7 (emphasizing
expert reports which stated the dishwasher door switch was defective, and was the cause of
the resulting fire); Porter v. United States Wheel & Wire Co., 436 F. Supp. 1376. 1381-82
(N.D. Iowa 1977) (recognizing that a shopping cart lacked stability when it fell on a child.
and that the child's actions were reasonably foreseeable): Austin v. Otis Elevator Co.. 336
So. 2d 914. 918 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the failure to insulate leads on an elevator
rendered it defective): Blevins v. Cushman Motors. 551 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Mo. 1977)
(presenting evidence that the stability of a golf cart could be improved by altering several
components on the cart): Fritz v. White Consol. Indus.. 762 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2003) (alleging that a dehumidifier was defective because the device failed to provide
secondary protection against circuit overload); see also McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp.,
778 P.2d 59, 80 (Wyo. 1989) (stating that the question of whether a product has been defec-
tively designed can only be determined by examining the surrounding circumstances at the
time the product was sold).
91. See King v. Damiron Corp., 113 F.3d 93, 95 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the Con-
necticut Products Liability Act includes injury caused by the manufacturer's assembly of
the product); Foutch v. Joy Mfg. Co., No. 94-5777, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32115, at *10-11
(6th Cir. Sept. 25, 1995) (noting that the Kentucky Products Liability Act includes the
manufacturer's assembly of the product); Ford Motor Co. v. Massey, 855 S.W.2d 897, 902
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plored here. What is important, however, is that if we are con-
fronted with non-conforming subject matter, why should strict
products liability be invoked if it is not certain that a product is
involved?
Perhaps, when faced with this dilemma, it would be best to re-
vert to a line of reasoning that has been utilized not only in cases
based upon actionable negligence, but strict products liability as
well. That would be the risk/benefit analysis93 attributable to Judge
(Ark. 1993) (explaining that the use of a particular material in a repair may render the
product defective as a result of mismanufacture): Lewis v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 97
Cal. Rptr. 798, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (explaining that the manufacturer's failure to com-
ply with its own design with regards to assembly constitutes a manufacturing defect); Dean
v. Toyota Indus. Equip. Mfg., Inc., 540 S.E.2d 233, 235 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that a
party assembling the parts of a third party is subject to strict liability as a manufacturer):
see also Charles E. Cantu, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability for Ultra-Hazard-
ous Activities from Szrict Products Liability Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts: Two Parallel Lines of Reasoning That Should Never Meet, 35 AKRON L.
REv. 31. 45 (2001) (arriving at the conclusion that a mis-manufactured product stands
alone; the defect may be the result of a missing screw, missing safety device, or an un-
secured bolt).
92. See Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp.. 7 P.3d 795, 807 (Wash. 2000) (Talmade,
J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that "[m]ost courts agree that, for the
liability system to be fair and efficient, the balancing of risks and benefits in judging prod-
uct design and marketing must be done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoid-
ance techniques reasonably attainable at the time of distribution"); see also Ralph D.
Davis, Different Treatment of Marketing and Design Defects in Pure Risk- Utility Balancing:
Who's the Villain?. 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 41,50 (1989) (writing. "Advertising, especially adver-
tising portraying product use, creates representational attributes, and does so by design.
Even if the advertising is only for the purpose of product name awareness or image with no
product portrayal, such advertising contributes to overall familiarity with, and hence confi-
dence in, a particular product."); George W. Flynn & John J. Lavaruso, The Existence of a
Duty to Warn: A Question for the Court or the Jury?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 633, 639-
43 (2000) (highlighting cases involving failure to warn as a basis for liability in products
liability litigation); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1515 (1992)
(stating that "if the design or marketing of a product is defective, every unit in the product
line is defective").
93. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169. 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (creating
the Hand test for determining negligence). In U.S. v. Carroll, Judge Hand promulgated
what would become the "Learned Hand Test" for determining whether duty exists for an
individual. Id. In the case of a ship owner whose barge broke away from the dock where it
was fastened, the ship owner's duty arises as a function of three variables: first, the
probability that the ship will break away; second, the gravity of the resulting injury if the
ship does break away; and third the burden of adequate precautions. Id. In dictum, Judge
Hand expressed the ability of the variables to change with regard to the factual surround-
ings of each element. Id. With regard to the first element, if a storm is present, the
probability of the ship breaking away increases; likewise, if the ship is moored in a crowded
harbor with much movement, the gravity of the resulting injury will also increase. Id.
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:341
Learned Hand.94 It has proved over the years to be helpful when
attempting to determine whether the defendant was negligent,95 as
well as in strict products liability cases where we are attempting to
prove that the product at issue has been mis-designed 96 or mis-
marketed. 97
Judge Hand also recognized that the ship must not be a prison for the ship owner; the
burden of reducing the harm must be weighed against the probability of loss and the grav-
ity of injury. Id. Thus according to Judge Hand's test, in a crowded harbor, in the presence
of a storm, a ship owner on board attempting to secure the ship to prevent damage may not
be liable, whereas the same ship owner who is absent for twenty-one hours during the
storm and who offers no precautionary measures, may be liable. Id.
94. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE
(1994) (describing the life of Learned Hand). Billings Learned Hand was born on January
27, 1872. Id. at 3. Hand, a Harvard graduate, was sworn in as a federal district court judge
in 1909. Id. at 133. He was then later sworn in as a judge for the Second Circuit on De-
cember 29, 1924. Id. at 276. After serving as a Senior Judge and Chief Judge, Hand retired
in 1951. Id. at 639. Hand died August 18, 1961. Id. at 679.
95. See Galarnyk v. Hostmark Mgmt., Inc., 2003 WL 137565, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 16,
2003) (stating that the defendant's precautions were adequate based on the Hand
formula): Bhd. Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 985 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir.
1993) (applying the Hand formula to determine if the city port was negligent in damage to
the plaintiff's vessel): Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 125 (Cal. 2001) (reciting that an
action based on negligence in the design of a product involves balancing the likelihood of
harm expected from a given design along with the gravity of harm if an accident occurs,
against the burden of adopting necessary precautions, which would be required to avoid
the harm): Pinsonneault v. Merchs. & Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 738 So. 2d 172, 187 (La.
Ct. App. 1999) (noting that "[i]f the product of the likelihood of injury multiplied times the
seriousness of the injury exceeds the burden of the precautions, the risk is unreasonable
and the failure to take precautions or sacrifice the interest is negligence"): Mickle v. Black-
mon, 166 S.E.2d 173, 192 (S.C. 1969) (stating that the duty of care was to take precautions
in light of known risks, balancing the likeEhood of harm and gravity of potential harm):
Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 927 P.2d 240, 251 (Wash. 1996) (holding that a party may not
be found liable in negligence unless the burden of adequate precautions is outweighed by
the gravity of the resulting injury multiplied by the probability of the injury).
96. See Merrill v. Navegar. Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 125 (Cal. 2001) (stating that whether a
product has been mis-designed involves balancing the likelihood of harm from injurious
design and the gravity of harm, against the burden of the precaution which would prevent
harm): Goodlow v. City of Alexandria. 407 So. 2d 1305, 1308 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
that probability and magnitude of the risk, balanced against the utility of the alleged defec-
tive product, determines whether risk is unreasonable): Sanders v. W. Auto Supply Co..
183 S.E.2d 321, 324 (S.C. 1971) (applying risk/utility balancing test to determine whether
the design was defective for lack of a blade guard on a lawnmower); Hernandez v. Tokai
Corp.. 2 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tex. 1999) (explaining the use of risk-utility analysis in determin-
ing whether a defective product is unreasonably dangerous).
97. See Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez. 581 P.2d 271, 278 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (indicating
that whether a product is unreasonably dangerous because of failure to warn turns on
foreseeability, seriousness, and cost of prevention); see also Charles E. Cantu, Distinguish-
ing the Concept of Strict Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities from Strict Products Lia-
bility Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: Two Parallel Lines of
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In the area of actionable negligence, the formula is expressed as
(PL)(G) > B = N. 98 In other words, we take the probability of loss
(PL), and multiply this by the gravity of foreseeable harm (G). If
we compare this to the burden (B) of reducing the risk, or at best,
eliminating it, and it turns out to be less, then the defendant is
deemed negligent (N). 99 On the other hand, if the burden is
greater than the probability of loss times the gravity of such harm,
(PL)(G) < B ? N, the defendant is not liable. 10 The same formula
has been used in strict products liability in the areas of design'01
and marketing. 0 2  In this instance, however, we take the
probability of loss (PL), and multiply this by the gravity of the fore-
seeable harm (G). If this is more than the burden of reducing the
Reasoning That Should Never Meet, 35 AKRON L. REV. 31, 45, 52-53 (2001) (stating that at
first glance, under a risk-balancing test approach, the burden of placing an extra warning
on a label would always be outweighed by the probability and magnitude of harm: how-
ever. a point of diminishing return precludes warnings for all possible dangers).
98. United States v. Carroll Towing Co.. 159 F.2d 169. 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
99. Id.
t00. Id.
101. See Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33, 44 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that reasona-
ble care in design is determined by balancing the gravity and likelihood of harm against the
precautions of reducing harm (citing Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78 (N.Y.
1976))): Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116. 125 (Cal. 2001) (stating that whether a prod-
uct has been mis-designed involves balancing the likelihood of harm from injurious design
and the gravity of harm if it occurs, against the burden of preventing the harm): Goodlow
v. Alexandria, 407 So. 2d 1305, 1308 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (reasoning that probability and
magnitude of risk balanced against the utility of the alleged defective product determines
whether the risk is unreasonable); Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251. 258 (Tex. 1999)
(explaining the use of risk-utility analysis in determining whether a defective product is
unreasonably dangerous).
102. See Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp.. 7 P.3d 795. 807 (Wash. 2000) (noting
that "[m]ost courts agree that, for the liability system to be fair and efficient, the balancing
of risks and benefits in judging product design and marketing must be done in light of the
knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably attainable at the time of dis-
tribution"); see also Ralph D. Davis, Different Treatment of Marketing and Design Defects
in Pure Risk-Utility Balancing: Who's the Villain?, 27 AM. Bus. L.J. 41, 50 (1989) (writing,
"Advertising, especially advertising portraying product use, creates representational attrib-
utes, and does so by design. Even if the advertising is only for the purpose of product
name awareness or image with no product portrayal, such advertising contributes to over-
all familiarity with, and hence confidence in, a particular product.") James A. Henderson,
Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1515 (1992) (explaining that mis-marketing renders the
entire product line defective); cf First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agric. Prods., Inc., 537 P.2d
682, 691 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (commenting that a general warning is insufficient warnings
must adequately indicate the scope of the danger).
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risk through redesigning the product or issuing additional warnings
or instructions, then the product is deemed to be defective (D).
This analysis, which has proved to be so useful and effective in
these areas, could also be utilized when attempting to determine
whether strict products liability should be applied. We would again
take the probability of loss (PL) resulting from the use of the sub-
ject matter and multiply this by the gravity (G) of foreseeable
harm. Obviously, the magnitude of the foreseeable harm is the
most important issue to be considered."°3 One need only consider
the comparison of a scenario involving a defective baby pig used
for educational dissection purposes 10 4 with slaughtered hogs in-
tended for mass consumption. The pig intended for dissection
would result in some economic loss, while the hogs intended for
consumption would inflict serious harm to a multitude of individu-
als. Liability should be imposed in both cases, but should strict
products liability apply? Stated differently: should the defendant
in this instance be held responsible if due care was employed?
An argument could be made for either side, but perhaps the
more logical and equitable position would be to impose strict prod-
ucts liability in cases wherein it is not certain a product is at issue,
but only in those instances where the foreseeable loss involves
great harm. If we were to restate the risk benefit analysis to apply
to this particular scenario, it would be: probability of loss (PL)
times the gravity (G) of harm balanced against the burden (B) of
reducing or eliminating such harm would result in invoking strict
products liability only when the burden was less than the sum of
the preceding factors. Or stated conversely, strict products liability
is not applicable when there is no risk of great harm. 105 This posi-
tion would save manufacturers or others engaged in the process of
placing goods into the stream of commerce from the ramifications
of strict liability when an injured plaintiff brought a superfluous
103. See Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 601 P.2d 298, 301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)
(reasoning that "[t]he greater the danger caused by the defect the greater the restraint
upon the court to foreclose adjudication of culpability"); Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So.
2d 585, 588 (La. 1980) (noting that "[i]n both negligence and strict liability cases, the
probability and magnitude of the risk are to be balanced against the utility of the thing").
104. See Anderson v. Farmers Hybrid Co., 408 N.E.2d 1194, 1199-1200 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (addressing a products liability cause of action where the product at issue was a pig).
105. Cf supra notes 6-12 (citing examples of cases and statutes of where strict prod-
ucts liability has been applied).
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claim,106 or one wherein there is no great resulting injury. 107 At the
same time, it would not isolate these same individuals from liability
if it was established that they failed to exercise ordinary care in a
situation where a reasonable and prudent person would do so,1°8 or
the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code were
held to apply.10 9
The time has come to limit an individual's liability." 0 We can no
longer continue to impose strict products liability upon a seller in
106. Tran v. Kemper Ins. Cos., No. 01-6140, 2003 WL 245337, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 31.
2003) (concluding that the plaintiffs failed to consume any of the food products they al-
leged to be defective).
107. See, e.g., LeBeau v. Dimig, 446 N.W.2d 800, 801 (Iowa 1989) (explaining that the
plaintiff suffered injuries which required less than $200 worth of medical expenses): City of
Cincinnati v. Barretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601, at *8-9 (Ohio. Ct. App.
Aug. 11, 2000) (stating that the plaintiff city suffered no physical injury or economic loss);
see also William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of
Contract Over Tort, 44 U. MIAMi L. REV. 731. 799 (1990) (citing cases which denied recov-
ery under strict liability absent an "accident-like injury").
108. See McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., 788 F.2d 321. 328 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming
the dismissal of the strict liability claim but reversing the directed verdict on the negligence
claim); Sumitomo Bank v. Taurus Developers, Inc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 719. 720 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (affirming the dismissal of the strict liability claim but remanding on the negligence
claim): Young v. Key Pharms., 922 P.2d 59. 60 (Wash. 1996) (affirming the dismissal of the
strict liability claim and reinstating the jury verdict on the negligence claim); Carlson v.
Trailor Equip. & Supply, Inc., 600 N.W.2d 54, 54 (Wis. App. Ct. 1999) (affirming the trial
court's decision to dismiss the strict liability claim and allow plaintiff to proceed under a
negligence theory).
109. See Henry Heide. Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105. 112-13 (3d Cir. 1985)
(dismissing the plaintiff's strict liability claim but allowing the breach of implied warranty
claim to proceed); Mathieson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 529 So. 2d 761, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (finding that dismissing the strict liability claim was proper, while dismissal of
the breach of warranty claim was improper) Wood v. Parke Davis & Co., 374 N.E.2d 683.
689 (Il. App. Ct. 1978) (stating that the plaintiff failed to allege the essential elements of
failure to warn or the elements of an unreasonably dangerous product, but could proceed
under breach of implied warranty): Richards v. Midland Brick Sales Co., 551 N.W.2d 649,
651-52 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (dismissing the plaintiff's strict liability case but allowing the
breach of warranty claim): Lower Lake Dock Co. v. Messinger Bearing Corp.. 577 A.2d
631, 636 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (dismissing the strict liability claim and granting the plaintiff
summary judgment on breach of warranty); Hofstee v. Dow, 36 P.3d 1073, 1078 (Wash.
App. 2001) (dismissing the recovery theory based on strict liability and negligence because
only economic injury occurred, but allowing the warranty claim).
110. See Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based Compensation System for Product-
Related Injuries, 58 U. PTT. L. REV. 669, 672 (1997) (referring to the belief that the "steady
expansion of liability has now reached the point where the entire system of products liabil-
ity is in danger of collapsing under the weight of excessive producer liability"); Richard A.
Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2193,
2222 (1989) (criticizing the explosion and growth of judicial regulation of product liability
law); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
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all situations. Strict products liability is a friend to consumers, but
it should not also bring about the downfall of manufacturers who
are not in a position to pass the cost of liability on to their custom-
ers t 1 or to insure themselves against this type of loss. 112 The com-
promise offered is an equitable solution to this conundrum.
1521, 1587 (1987) (discussing the insurance crisis and its effect on product and service mar-
kets); William E. Westerbeke, The Sources of Controversy in the New Restatement of Prod-
ucts Liability: Strict Liability Versus Products Liability, 8 KAN J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 6
(1998) (stating that Section 402A was originally intended to deal with traditional recovery
obstacles, but has become "an all-purpose and all-encompassing cause of action to deal
with the whole field of products liability"). Professor Priest states that:
[many] state legislatures have enacted some form of tort reform legislation [which
may] ... (1) [place] monetary caps on non-economic damages, (2) [place] caps or
other limitations on punitive damages, (3) [abrogate] joint and several liability. (4)
[eliminate] the collateral source rule, and (5) [make] amendments to substantive liabil-
ity standards for ... municipal operations, dramshops. or non-profit organizations.
George L. Priest. The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1587-88 (1987).
111. See Ranalli v. Edro Motel Corp., 690 A.2d 137, 141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997) (stating that a motel providing kitchen utensils for use in the kitchenette cannot pass
the cost along the chain of commerce and will be punished, although innocent, if strict
liability is applied); Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Neg-
ligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596 (1980)
(explaining that "[the] manufacturer can spread the risk through insurance and price ad-
justments, whereas the injured individual might suffer a crushing financial blow underwrit-
ing the loss himself"). The ability to pass along the cost of injury is one of the underlying
foundations of strict products liability. Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co. clearly outlines the underlying policy considerations for what
would become strict products liability. See generally Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150
P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor. J.. concurring). In his opinion, one of the bricks in the strict
liability foundation is the fact that retailers and manufacturers can distribute the cost of
injury to the consumers, where the injured consumer does not have this option. Id. at 441.
112. See Shanks v. Upjohn Co.. 835 P.2d 1189, 1195 (Alaska 1992) (stating that the
threat of strict product liability litigation may impair drug manufacturers' ability to obtain
liability insurance): see also George L. Priest. The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern
Tort Law. 96 YALE L.J. 1521. 1521 (1987) (stating that certain "products. such as vaccines.
general aircraft, and sports equipment" were faced with drastic insurance premiums). Fur-
thermore. other service-oriented businesses such as wine tasting, day care. and products
such as intrauterine devices were refused coverage at any premium. and were therefore
forced or withdrawn from the market. Id. Twenty-five percent of large corporations
whose size and self-insurance capability render them vulnerable to changes in the commer-
cial insurance market have reported removing products or services from the market be-
cause of the cost or lack of insurance coverage. Id. at 1522. To compensate for increased
insurance premiums. aircraft manufacturers are substantially increasing the cost of each
aircraft sold ($80,000 increase in the cost of every Beech aircraft that is sold, and $75,000
for each Piper aircraft sold). Cessna, another aircraft manufacturer, elected to discontinue
particular lines of small aircraft because the insurance requirements per aircraft sold ex-
ceeded $75,000 per airplane. Id. at 1566-67. "When market insurers refuse coverage, a
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V. CONCLUSION
Our discussion has established that products liability litigation
continues its exciting path of exploration. As was stated in the In-
troduction: what was at first considered to be so simple has in some
cases proved to be slightly more complex. "One who sells any
product in a defective condition" will be held responsible under the
umbrella of strict products liability law. How or when do we con-
sider the subject matter before us as a product? In those cases
wherein the issue is not clear, the courts have continued to avoid a
primary dictionary meaning approach and instead have continued
to employ a policy-based technique. Hopefully, a logical guideline
has been proposed for this method. The courts in all probability
will continue their stated course. But now, perhaps they will do so
only when the probability of great loss is foreseeable.
provider is left with [two] choice[s],"-discontinue the product, or continue as a self-in-
surer. Id. at 1578.
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